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Both U.S. and English courts has confronted with the concurrent situations mostly 
occurring in the cases where 1) the plaintiff asks for the recovery in tort claim despite the 
existence of contractual relationship or 2) the plaintiff asserts contract claim but the defendant 
contends that the issue at bar should be sound in tort rather than in contract. After studying all 
relevant cases and academic writings, this thesis found that both U.S. and English systems 
generally recognize concurrent tort claim as an elective right. The courts have attempted to 
provide the justified rationales either to allow the plaintiffs tort claim or to apply tort rules 
according to the defendant's defense. All rationales given is definitely aimed at significant 
aspects including the protection of parties' expectation, the creation of justice, and the 
reinforcement of public policy. However, there are also the restrictions on the permissive rule of 
concurrent claim. The critical limitations on the rights to tort claim are as follows: 
Firstly, because both U.S. and English courts generally recognized that the recovery for 
economic loss is limited only in contract claim, plaintiffs' rights to tort claim for pure economic 
loss is limited. U.S. law recognized plaintiffs tort claim for economic loss only in the cases of 
professional negligence and of bad faith breach of contract. However, some courts are 
attempting to develop and apply the independent duty doctrine to permit more tort claims of 
negligence especially for economic loss. Furthermore, tort liability for bad faith breach of 
contract is mainly limited only in the relationship in insurance contract. To prevent an 
opportunistic breach of contract, this thesis suggests that the concept of bad faith breach should 
not be limited only in an insurance contract. Similarly, English law invokes the principle of 
assumption ofresponsibility that requires the special relationship between the parties in order to 
grant the award to the plaintiff who assert concurrent claim of negligence for economic loss. 
vi 
Secondly, it is clear that under English law, the tortious duty of care can be excluded or 
limited by the exculpatory clause or contractual term of liquidated damages. While English 
courts refuse to impose the duty of care which is inconsistent with what the parties have agreed 
in their contract, it is not apparent that U.S. courts entirely refuse to impose tortious duty of care 
which is inconsistent with what the parties have voluntarily agreed in their contract. As to this 
approach of English system, this thesis suggests that it would be fair, just and reasonable if U.S. 
courts apparently adopt and apply this kind oflimitation to restrict concurrent tort claim in U_.S. 
jurisdictions in order to sustain the freedom of contract doctrine which has the dominant aim to 
protect the contracting parties' bargain of interest in allocation of their particular risk in the 
particular way so far as their interest is not outweighed by the mandatory law or public policy. 
Thirdly, it is suggested by scholars' views that the doctrine of efficient breach recognized 
in U.S. contract law should be taken into account in limiting the imposition of tort liability on the 
breaching party particularly in commercial transaction if breaching party can prove that 
nonperformance is economically efficient. This thesis agrees with this suggestion because this 
would neither lead to the destruction of well-established concept of efficient breach nor bring 
about the unreasonable consequences that cause harm to the public economic interest. 
Lastly, some English courts is inclined to limit the scope ofrecoverable damages in 
concurrent tort claim by applying the similar test of remoteness of the breach of contract claim to 
the tort claim. This restrictive approach aims at the protection of the parties' expectation interest 
rather than deterrence the wrongful conduct. As for such reason, this thesis suggests that the 
limitation on the scope of recoverable damages is justifiable only in the case where the tortious 
duty being imposed by virtue of a contract rather than being imposed by the virtue of provision 
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A. Concurrent Claim Situations 
Typically, in legal systems around the world, there exist two main sources of obligations 
including contract and tort.  Both branches of law have played an important role in attempting to 
fully compensate the injured parties for a breach of contract and a breach of duties imposed by 
law, respectively.  Although the laws of contract and tort are separate areas, both have given rise 
to complicated concurrent liability issues and, thereby, the issue of concurrent claims has 
become prevalent in judicial practices worldwide, occurring in many different contexts, 
particularly construction, professional advice, employment, sales of goods and public services.   
The core problem relevant to the issue of concurrent claim lies in the legal uncertainties 
of the plaintiff’s rights to compensation due to the fact that both the rules of contract law and 
those of torts may be applied to determine the damages in the dispute.  Especially, when both 
requirements for contractual and tortious liability are simultaneously satisfied, the question arises 
as to whether tortious liability may be asserted concurrently with liability for a breach of 
contract.  Stated clearly, it may appear that the contracting party’s conduct not only violates the 
express or implied duties set forth in the contractual provisions but may also violate other duties 
that are imposed by law.  Therefore, it is possible that breach of contractual obligation can give 
rise to alternative claims in tort.  However, it is well to keep in mind that while there may be 
concurrent liability, it is generally the case that a plaintiff will assert a claim in order to recover 
for remedies in the alternative.  In other words, a plaintiff can seek a remedy under one theory or 
the other so that he will not have double recovery for remedies based on both causes of action. 
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While the problems are typically raised when both requirements for contractual and 
tortious liability are reached, prior to allowing an alternative right, it is important to examine 
whether the contracting party is liable for damages based on tort law.  As we can see in tort law, 
the tortious liability may be different depending on both the relationship between the parties in 
different types of contract and the alleged conduct of the contracting party.  
In deciding concurrent cases, courts generally begin by considering the existence of 
tortious liability.  Though there are different types of contractual disputes such as construction 
disputes, malpractice disputes arising from professional services contracts, employment disputes, 
sales of goods, and other public services disputes, most of these cases mainly involve claims of 
negligence.  This is because negligence has been the central basis for liability in most tort cases.1   
Considering the negligence cause of action, the court will particularly consider the problem 
regarding the duty of care to determine whether the plaintiff can ask for damages based on 
negligence.  This thesis will mainly examine the extent to what the scope of duty is imposed in 
some kinds of contracts and the limitations on tortious duty owed by the contracting party.  
B. An Influence of the Different Rules and Principles to Concurrent Claims 
Contractual and tortious liability are dissimilar in many respects, including the 
requirement of liability, the scope of remedies, the limitation of action, and the validity of 
exculpatory clause.  These differences influence plaintiffs’ choices of remedy.  This thesis will 
explain such differences in order to understand the rules and principles of those core areas of 
private law and to address the reasons why the contracting party wants to rely on a tort claim 
instead of asserting breach of contract.  Normally, the plaintiff prefers to pursue a tort claim, to 
                                                          
1 JOHN L. DIAMOND, LAWRENCE C. LEVINE & ANITA BERNSTEIN, UNDERSTANDING TORTS  46 
(4th ed. 2010). 
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some extent, due to the different categories of reasons including (1) broader scope of remedies 
(e.g., damages for emotional distress and punitive damages); (2) more favorable limitations 
period; (3) getting around a lack of privity; (4) getting around an exculpatory clause.  
Additionally, if the plaintiff asserts a tort claim especially when both contractual and tort claim 
are pleaded in one suit, the court will inevitably undertake the dilemma responsibility to draw the 
principle of concurrency and find the borderline between such causes of action.  This thesis will 
thereby examine whether the court allows the plaintiff to rely on an alternative tort claim when 
he wants some advantages of such claim.  This is important because the extent to which the court 
allows the plaintiff to rely on a tort theory will affect the scope of remedies acquired by the 
plaintiff.  Furthermore, the concept and policy of recognition of concurrent claims will be 
examined by exploring the historical development of concurrent claims. 
C. Relevant Questions and Scope of Study 
In terms of the right of the contracting party to bring an alternative tort claim in respect of 
the same subject matter, there are two different authorities both in Civil Law system and 
Common Law system.  The comparison between the two legal systems is definitely worth 
studying.  However, in this thesis I would start by exploring and comparing U.S. law and English 
law as the examples of common law system.  Although they have the similar framework of most 
of contract and tort law, I found some interesting differences in the conditions and limitations on 
concurrent liability between contract and tort that will be illustrated and analyzed in this thesis.  
The law of civil law system will definitely be taken into account in my future works in order to 
provide a thorough research on concurrent liability between contract and tort.   
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Additionally, under U.S. common law rules, the doctrine of promissory estoppel is used 
to protect plaintiffs who had, in their detriment, relied on a defendants’ assurances without the 
protection of a formal contract.2  Furthermore, the promissory estoppel is originally applied to 
protect plaintiffs who had, in their own detriment, relied on pre-contractual or non-contractual 
representation.3  In case of the borderline between tort and contract law, there are some 
discussions on pre-contractual liability under U.S. law.  It appeared that the doctrine of 
promissory estoppel is used to impose tort-like liability for bad faith in a contract context.  It is 
suggested that the promissory estoppel is related to the situation where the plaintiff is seeking 
recovery for loss or damage suffered as the result of reliance on the defendants’ promises or 
representations.4  Thus, it is noteworthy that tort liability has interfered the realm of contract law 
in the cases where the courts permit the plaintiff to assert promissory estoppel claim for the 
damages suffered as a result of his reliance on the defendant’s promise or representation 
occurring during pre-contractual period.  Undoubtedly, in such situations the plaintiff cannot ask 
for contract claim since no contract is actually formed between plaintiff and defendant.  All such 
situations are very interesting however the doctrine of promissory estoppel as a tort-like liability 
will not be studied in this thesis.   
As to the scope and objective of this thesis, the important questions are (1) On what 
conditions and limitations is the plaintiff permitted to rely on tort claim? (2) What is the rationale 
for both excluding and allowing tort claim under the concept of concurrent liability? (3) Which 
                                                          
2 GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT, 70 (Ronald K.L. Collins 2d ed., 1995). 
3 See GILMORE, Id. at 80. 
4 See GILMORE, Id. at 97. 
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approach of both U.S. and English legal system should be taken into account to balance the 
interests of both the plaintiff and the defendant as well as of public policy? 
This paper will profoundly explore and determine both relevant U.S. and English cases as 
well as academic writing with respect to the extent to which the plaintiff is entitled to rely on tort 
claim under U.S. and English Law.  To begin with, both U.S. and English Law recognize the 
existence of concurrent liability in its own conditions based on both the difference of the scope 
of contractual and tortious liability and other contexts or circumstances.  In brief, under English 
law, according to Henderson v. Merrett Syndicates Ltd. [1995] 2 AC 145 (HL), the House of 
Lords held that a contract between plaintiff and defendant can lead to an “assumption of 
responsibility” in tortious liability as long as the contractual terms are “not inconsistent” with a 
duty of care, while under U.S. law, case law recognized the existence of a free elective 
concurrence.  In Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654 (1958), the Supreme 
Court of California held that “…it is the rule that where a case sounds both in contract and tort 
the plaintiff will ordinarily have freedom of election between an action of tort and one of 
contract…”  Regarding the foregoing approaches, this thesis will provide comparative analysis 
between these two legal regimes.  This study will add the element of legal certainty into a legal 
system of U.S. and English Law and allow both the courts and lawyers as parts of practical 
sectors to consider the certain rights of the plaintiffs under the issue of concurrent liability.  
Moreover, from the comparative perspective, this thesis will find what is the qualified right of 
the parties in such concurrent cases.  Apart from the conditions and limitations that are evidently 
recognized by U.S. and English courts, the question whether any other appropriate conditions 
and limitations proposed by the scholars should be taken into account to consider the plaintiff’s 
right to tort claim in concurrent situation will also be examined. 
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II. THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CONTRACTUAL AND TORTIOUS LIABILITY 
 This chapter will discuss the contractual liability and tortious liability under U.S. and 
English Law in three different aspects.  It will mainly concentrate on the differences between the 
contract law and tort law on the aspect of the right to remedies rather than the matter of 
procedure.   
A. Requirements of Liability 
 Under the adversary system of common law, the plaintiff is mainly permitted and 
required to present all relevant facts of the case by filing the complaint describing the facts and 
claiming his right against the defendant.5  To recover damages arising from either breach of 
contract or tortious conduct, the plaintiff must illustrate the facts by a preponderance of the 
evidence to meet all elements of action in order to establish a prima facie case.  The requirements 
of contract liability are different from liability in tort because of the distinction in the underlying 
rules and principles.  
1. Elements of Action under U.S. Law 
 In order to ask for the recovery, the plaintiff has to plead an adequacy of asserting claim 
otherwise the complaint will be dismissed.  This means that the complaint must allege enough 
facts to show that a claim is plausible and not merely conceivable.6  In addition, merely 
providing any labels, conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action 
                                                          
5 DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, HORNBOOK ON TORTS 34 (2d ed. 
2016). 
6 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 
7 
 
will not suffice.7  Before considering the rules on concurrence, the elements of contract claim 
and tort claim should be identified and explained.  
1.1 Elements of a Prima Facie Breach of Contract Case. 
 First, there must exist the enforceable contract if the contracting parties want to rely on 
the contractual rights to remedies.  Contract is defined as a promise or a set of promises that the 
law will enforce.8  Bargain for exchange is the primary concern for the court to enforce a 
promise.  When the promisee has given the promisor something in return for exchange, that is 
considered as the consideration, courts will be willing to enforce such promise that have been 
made by the promisor.9  Accordingly, the contractual obligations are imposed by contract that 
the parties intend to be bound.  It is clear that neither the remedies for damages nor the remedy 
for specific performance is available in case of the breach of an unenforceable contract.10  A few 
classes of contracts also require a written memorandum signed by or on behalf of the party to be 
charged in order to be enforceable.11  The courts have determined that a failure to satisfy the 
requirement of written memorandum merely precludes enforcement of the agreement against 
that party.12  Nevertheless, in such case courts generally allow the injured party restitution of 
any benefit that he has conferred on the other party by part performance or otherwise.13  The 
                                                          
7 Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008). 
8 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
9 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH ET AL., CONTRACTS 3 (4th ed. 2004); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF CONTRACTS § 17 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
10 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 8 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
11 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 110, 131 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
12 See FARNSWORTH ET AL., supra note 9, at 398; see also Herring v. Volume Merch., Inc., 106 
S.E.2d 197, 200 (N.C.1958). 
13 See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 402. 
8 
 
Restatement Second of Contracts also added a section stating that “A promise which the 
promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promise of 
a third person and which does induce the action or forbearance is enforceable notwithstanding 
the Statute of Frauds if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.”  In such 
case the remedy granted for breach is to be limited as justice requires. 14  Some courts reject this 
Restatement Second rule while others rely on this rule to add an exception.15  Notably, when the 
party acts under a contract that is unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds, the contracting 
party’s conduct is not considered to be tortious if it occurs without notice of repudiation of such 
contract.16  All in all, the most significant limitation on the enforcement of contract is the 
requirement of consideration.17 
 Second, when a breach of contract occurs, the breaching party is liable for the loss 
injured by the other party.  When performance is due any failure to render it is a breach.18  For 
example, the builder who fails in any respect to perform when performance is due has become 
liable for breach of contract irrespective of his fault.  This is true although the defect is 
insubstantial.  Even if it is neither willful nor negligent, and even if the builder is unaware of it, 
he can be held liable.  When the non-breaching party suffered from the breach, he can ask for 
the relief but he is still obliged to perform his duty otherwise he will be in breach.  The injured 
                                                          
14 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 139 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
15 See FARNSWORTH ET AL., supra note 9, at 408. 
16 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 142 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
17 See FARNSWORTH ET AL., supra note 9, at 47. 
18 See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 535. 
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party can suspend his performance only if the breach is material.19  The courts also allow the 
injured party to terminate the contract only after an appropriate length of time has passed.20  
Understandably, if the contracting party who is bound by contract refuses to perform his 
obligation, he is responsible for the remedial damages that the other party suffers.  In the case 
when the breach of contract occurs either in the case of nonfeasance or misfeasance21, the 
promisor must pay the compensation to the promisee in order to put the promisee in as good a 
position as he would have been in had the contract been fully performed.  To put the injured 
party in the position that he expects to be in is the measure generally used today in actions 
founded on promises that are enforceable.22   
 Third, under the privity doctrine, the plaintiff must be the party to the contract who 
suffered from the breach in order to assert contractual claim.  The persons other than the parties 
of the contract generally cannot enforce the contract although they receive benefits from the 
contract.  This is because they are not in “privity” with the promisor.23  However, there are some 
situations that recognize the right of the intended beneficiary to enforce the contract.24  This is 
the reason why the court also encounters the issue of concurrence where the person who suffers 
from damages arising out of the contracting party’s conduct is a third person to the contract. 
                                                          
19 See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 562. 
20 See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 562. 
21 See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 16. 
22 See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 46; see also Richard E. Speidel, The Borderland of Contract, 
10 N. KY. L. REV. 163, 166 (1982-1983). 
23 See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 652; see also Miss. High Sch. Activities Asso. v. Farris, 501 
So. 2d 393 (Miss. 1987). 
24 See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 657-58; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 
302 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
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1.2 Elements of a Prima Facie Tortious Case 
 Intentional torts and negligence are two main categories of tort liability that is based on 
wrongdoer’s fault.25  Modern tort law recognizes the strict liability doctrine in a few cases that 
impose the tortious liability on the tortfeasor without proof of his fault.26  While tortious liability 
is formally based on fault,27 liability in contract is traditionally strict liability.28  Tort liability 
based on fault is imposed in accordance with the corrective justice ideals.29  This chapter will 
mainly focus on the tort liability that based on faults, in particular, negligence and the tort of 
conversion30 because each of those kinds of tort and breach of contract may occur 
simultaneously.  Moreover, because negligence is an open-ended claim31 which allows the 
plaintiff to claim that any defendant’s conduct is acted under standard of care, it is plausible for 
plaintiff to establish parallel negligence action.  Thus, claims of negligence have always given 
rise to complicated concurrent liability issues to be considered. 
 In order to prevail in tort claim, the plaintiff has to provide the proof of facts that show all 
required elements of tort liability.  Fundamentally, the certain elements of the separated tort 
                                                          
25 See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, supra note 5, at 4. 
26 See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, Id. at 5. 
27 Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. 292 (1850). 
28 See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, supra note 5, at 7. 
29 See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, Id. at 19. 
30 See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, Id. at 107; see also DIAMOND, LEVINE & BERNSTEIN, supra 
note 1, at 21. (The tort of conversion is an intentional tort that protects the plaintiff’s possessory 
rights in personal property.  The defendant will be held being liable for conversion when he 
intentionally exercises a substantial control over the tangible personal property, interfering 
seriously with the plaintiff’s rights.  So conversion can be committed in many different ways 
such as dispossession, destruction, and acquiring possession, ownership, or security interests.). 
31 See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, Id. at 188. 
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claims are different.32  Additionally, the plaintiff has the burden of proof in tort case.33  In other 
words, it is the plaintiff’s duty to provide the evidences and persuade the jury to believe the 
weight of his evidences on all elements for tort he claims.  Without any valid defense, the 
plaintiff will be awarded for damages he claims for. 
a. Elements of Negligence Tort 
 We can see the rules of tort in negligence case that the plaintiff must prove the duty of 
care owed by the defendant and the failure of exercising reasonable standard of care under the 
circumstances.34  The duty of care may arise or base upon the existence of a contract, a statute, or 
common law.35  Furthermore, the ordinary rule of negligence is that negligent liability lies on the 
defendant only when the plaintiff can prove the legally recognized harms from which he 
suffers.36  Claims for negligence always need proof of actual harm.37  This element of actual 
harms in negligence action differs from that of some kinds of intentional tort such as battery, 
assault, fault imprisonment and differs from contract action.38 
Considering Duke & Co. v. Anderson, 275 Pa. Super. 65, 418 A.2d 613 (1980) as an 
example of legal malpractice claim, in this case the court provided the rule as to the burden of 
                                                          
32 See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, Id. at 38. 
33 See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, Id. at 39. 
34 See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, Id. at 42. 
35 See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, Id. at 204. 
36 See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, Id. at 29. 
37 See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, Id. at 189; see also Reardon v. Larkin, 3 A.3d 376 (Me. 
2010). 
38 See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, Id. at 54. 
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proof in concurrent claim either when the plaintiff sues in contract action or in tort.  The rules of 
law provided in this case are (1) in a legal malpractice action, the plaintiff has a choice between 
suing the attorney in assumpsit (contract) or in trespass (tort) and (2) the plaintiff is required to 
prove an essential element of actual loss for legal malpractice, whichever form of action the 
plaintiff chooses between assumpsit or trespass.  The development of the law in legal 
malpractice case required the element of actual loss because many jurisdictions treat legal 
malpractice action as sounding in tort.  
Apart from the foregoing elements, the proof of causations in fact and in law are also 
required.  Particularly, to consider the scope of liability for negligence (proximate causation), the 
court usually applies the foreseeability tests by holding that defendant is liable for all kinds of 
harms the defendant foreseeably risked by defendant’s negligent conduct.39  
 Stated briefly, the plaintiff has the burden of proof of facts and persuasion on negligence 
case.  All elements required are (1) the duty owned by defendant to exercise the ordinary 
standard of reasonable care in order to avoid risky harms to the plaintiff; (2) the defendant’s 
breach of duty of care by acting in unreasonable risky conduct; (3) the actual harms to the 
plaintiff in fact caused by defendant’s conduct (but-for test); (4) the proximate cause of the 
plaintiff’s harms that shows a significant relationship between the defendant’s conduct and the 
harms suffered by the plaintiff, and (5) the existence and the amount of damages.40   
  
                                                          
39 See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, Id. at 339. 
40 See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, Id. at 197-98. 
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b. Elements of Tort of Conversion 
Conversion is one kind of intentional tort that may be simultaneously asserted together 
with breach of contract.  It appears that the court at times held that breach of the bailment 
contract is a conversion.41  The tort recovery of conversion in bailment case must inevitably 
consider the effects of the bailment contract when the contract is the foundation of the 
bailment.42  For claiming of conversion, the plaintiff must prove the defendant’s intent to 
exercise substantial control over the plaintiff’s possession of the tangible property.43  In many 
cases, the bailee as the defendant in tort of conversion case has the burden of proof on his 
innocence in failing to return the bailed goods.44  
2. Elements of Action under English Law 
 Similarly, to consider the scope of concurrent liability under English law, we should 
examine the elements of contract claim and tort claim as well.  In doing so, we can explore and 
identify whether any requirements imposed by English law are different from those of U.S. law. 
                                                          
41 See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, Id. at 118; see also Fotos v. Firemen’s Ins. Co., 533 A.2d 
1264 (D.C. 1987); S/M Indus., Inc. v. Hapag-Lloyd A.G., 586 So. 2d 876 (Ala. 1991). 
42 See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, Id. at 119. (Tort law respects the bailor’s possession-
ownership rights and allows him to recover damages or the goods themselves against a bailee 
who converts bailed goods by non-return or otherwise.  For example, when the bailee does not 
return the goods, conversion claim can be asserted against the bailee.).  
43 See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, Id. at 107. 
44 See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, Id. at 118; see also Kearns v. McNeill Bros. Moving & 
Storage Co., 509 A.2d 1132 (D.C. 1986); Procter & Gamble Distrib. Co. v. Lawrence Am. Field 
Warehousing Corp., 213 N.E.2d 873 (N.Y.1965). 
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2.1 Elements of a Prima Facie Breach of Contract Case. 
First and foremost, the crucial element is the existence of a contract that is supported by 
consideration or made by deed.  Such contract must be certain and complete.  In order to 
establish the binding contract, the parties must intend to create the legal relations.45  
Fundamentally, the parties to a contract are free to determine the terms of a contact under the 
theory of freedom of contract.46  However, some contractual terms will be restricted for the 
policy reasons.47  Additionally, the contract must comply with any formal requirement needed 
for some agreements to be legally binding.  But the requirement of the particular forms is merely 
the exception in limited contracts such as a contract for the sale or other disposition of an interest 
in land.48  In essence, the need of consideration is required as a significant element of exchange 
for the enforceable contract under English law unless such contract is made by deed.49  
Secondly, if the party fails to perform his obligation under the terms of contract, such 
party would be liable for breach of contract unless there exists an exculpatory clause.50  The 
party may commit the breach without fault unless the express or implied terms of contract 
required the use of reasonable care when the party performs the contractual obligation, such as 
the obligations undertaken by a professional in respect of services for a client.51  Even though the 
law of contract is the different concept in comparison to the law of tort, it is not true that English 
                                                          
45 ANDREW BURROWS, A RESTATEMENT OF THE ENGLISH LAW OF CONTRACT 44 (2016). 
46 See BURROWS, Id. at 48. 
47 See BURROWS, Id. at 49. 
48 See BURROWS, Id. at 73; see also Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989, c. 34, 
§ 2 (Eng.). 
49 See BURROWS, Id. at 62-63. 
50 See BURROWS, Id. at 107. 
51 See BURROWS, Id. at 108. 
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law deny tort claim that arise in a contractual context.52  This will be considerably described in 
chapter five. 
 Thirdly, under the privity of contract doctrine, only the parties to the contract who can 
either enforce or be enforced under the contractual relationship. 53  In general, the third party 
cannot enforce the contract.  Nevertheless, there are the exceptions to privity rule, in particular, 
the exception is set out in the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999.54  Moreover, the 
privity rule allows the promisee to enforce the contract although such contract is one for the 
benefit of a third party.  However, the recoverable damages will be nominal.55  The Contracts 
(Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 recognizes a third party’s own right to directly enforce the 
terms of the contract on the condition that 1) the contract expressly provides that he may; or 2) 
the term of contract purports to confer a benefit on him unless there is the proper interpretation 
of the contract that the parties did not intend the third party to have that right.56  Therefore, the 
third party shall be entitled to any remedies that would have been available to him in an action 
for breach of contract if he had been a party to the contract.57  It is noteworthy that the promisee 
is still entitled to enforce any terms of the contract because the right of the third party is merely 
additional to the right of the promisee.58  The “circumventions of the privity” is acceptable under 
                                                          
52 See BURROWS, Id. at 45. 
53 See BURROWS, Id. at 240. 
54 See BURROWS, Id. at 241. 
55 See BURROWS, Id. at 241-42; see also Beswick v. Beswick [1968] AC 58 (HL) (appeal taken 
from Eng.). 
56 Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, c. 31, § 1(1) (Eng.). 
57 Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, c. 31, § 1 1(5) (Eng.). 
58 Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, c. 31, § 4 (Eng.). 
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English law.59  It has appeared that English common law allows the third party to bring an action 
for the tort of negligence instead of bringing an action for breach of contract in the case where 
the party’s breach of contract concurrently constitutes the breach of duty of care owned by the 
contracting party to the third party.60 
2.2 Elements of a Prima Facie Tortious Case 
Apart from the common law on tort, there are the statutory protections.  However, all 
statutes play only the supplementary role.61  Because tortious duty is imposed by law itself, 62 
tortious liability is distinguished from contractual liability.63  The content of the tortious duty is 
fixed by law whereas that of the contractual duty is fixed by both the contract itself and the 
law.64  However, the intent of the defendant in undertaking the responsibilities for certain 
conduct may lead to the existence of a negligence duty.65  Similar to U.S. tort law, tort liability 
may base upon fault such as intentional tort and negligence and may be the strict liability.66 
Generally speaking, most torts require proof of foreseeable damages as the consequence of 
                                                          
59 See BURROWS, supra note 45, at 248. 
60 See BURROWS, Id. at 248; see also White v. Jones [1995] 2 AC 207 (HL) (appeal taken from 
Eng.). 
61 JOHN FREDERIC CLERK & ANTHONY M. DUGDALE, CLERK & LINDSELL ON TORTS ¶ 1-18 (19th 
ed. 2006). 
62
 PERCY HENRY WINFIELD, WINFIELD AND JOLOWICZ ON TORT  4 (W. V. H. Rogers 11th ed 
Sweet & Maxwell, 1979). 
63 See WINFIELD, Id. at 4.  
64 See WINFIELD, Id. at 5. 
65 See CLERK & DUGDALE, supra note 61, ¶ 1-03. 
66 See WINFIELD, supra note 62, at 43. 
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defendant’s conduct except for trespass to land, to person or to goods which are the forms of 
intentional torts that are considered to be the torts actionable per se.67  
a. Elements of Negligence Tort 
In case of negligence, the elements of claim are (1) defendant’s legal duty owed to the 
plaintiff to exercise the standard of care; (2) defendant’s breach of duty; (3) the causation 
element that require the connection between the negligent conduct and damages and (4) the 
foreseeability of consequential damages. 68  As for the third and the forth elements, the plaintiff 
has to show that plaintiff’ damages are caused by the defendant’s breach of duty and such kind 
of damages are not too remote.69  In other words, the elements of causation including causation 
in fact and causation in law are also required.70  Therefore, the plaintiff must prove that the 
harms suffered would not occurred but for there has been the negligent conduct and such harms 
has been foreseen by the reasonable man.71  The plaintiff will lose the negligence case if he fails 
on the burden of proving the causation.72  In contrast, in case of conversion and strict liability, 
the causation requirement has followed from the nature of the tort.73 
                                                          
67 See WINFIELD, Id. at 447; see also CLERK & DUGDALE, supra note 61, ¶ 1-44. 
68 See WINFIELD, supra note 62, at 66. 
69 See WINFIELD, Id. at 109; see also CLERK & DUGDALE, supra note 61, ¶ 8-04. 
70 See WINFIELD, Id. at 110; see also CLERK & DUGDALE, Id. ¶ 2-01; JEB Fasteners Ltd. v. Marks 
Bloom & Co. [1983] 1 All ER 583 (appeal taken from Eng.). 
71 See WINFIELD, Id. at 116-17; see also CLERK & DUGDALE, Id. ¶ 2-06; Overseas Tankship 
(U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Enginerring Co. Ltd. (The Wagon Mound) [1961] AC 388 (appeal 
taken from Aus.) 
72 See CLERK & DUGDALE, Id. ¶ 2-06. 
73 See CLERK & DUGDALE, Id. ¶ 2-08. 
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Tort claim for recovering any damages arising from unsafe product may be asserted 
either in negligence or product liability action.  If the plaintiff seeks for liability in negligence, he 
must prove all elements needed specially proving breach of standard of care owes to the plaintiff.  
However, if the plaintiff as a consumer asserts the product liability action, the defendant’s 
liability will be governed by the Consumer Protection Act 1987.  Under Act of 1987, the 
defendant may be liable to the consumer for damages arising out of the unsafe products although 
neither the intentional or negligent conduct can be found on the part of defendant.74  So in this 
strict liability tort action, the plaintiff do not have to prove defendant’s fault but must prove that 
the injury arises from the defective product to assert product liability action.75 Notably, the 
plaintiff can assert tort claim to recover only for damages injured to plaintiff or to other 
properties not the product itself.76   
b. Elements of Tort of Conversion 
Conversion is a kind of unlawful appropriation of another’s chattel.77  When the plaintiff 
can prove that defendant unjustifiably deny the plaintiff’s rights or defendant wrongfully assert 
his right over the goods in a way inconsistent with the plaintiff’s rights such as taking, disposing, 
damaging, or destroying the goods, the defendant may be committed by conversion if the 
                                                          
74 See CLERK & DUGDALE, Id. ¶ 1-59. 
75 See CLERK & DUGDALE, Id. ¶ 1-59; see also Consumer Protection Act 1987, c. 43, §§ 2-3 
(Eng.). 
76 See CLERK & DUGDALE, Id. ¶ 11-02; see also Consumer Protection Act 1987, c. 43, § 5(1)(2) 
(Eng.). 
77 JOHN MURPHY, STREET ON TORTS 258 (12th ed. 2007).  (The tort of conversion protects the 
plaintiff’s possession or the right to immediate possession.  If the defendant intentionally deals 
with goods that is seriously inconsistent with the plaintiff’s possession or the right to immediate 
possession, he will be committed by conversion.).   
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defendant deliberately takes such conduct.78  So the intent of the defendant to take such wrongful 
conduct is needed to hold the defendant being liable for conversion.  Considering bailment 
situation,79 the plaintiff must prove the degree of departure from the contractual terms of the 
bailment in order to convince that bailee’s conduct amounts to conversion.80  For instance, the 
carrier commits a conversion when he, in breach of contract with the consignor, delivers the 
goods to the consignee and it appears that such delivery leads to the destruction of the 
consignor’s lien.81  
B. Scope of Remedies 
 The plaintiff may have a higher quantum of damages in tort claim than in contractual 
claim or vice versa.  This depends on some differences on several aspects including the measures 
of damages, the recoverable damages, and the limitations on damages.   
1. Scope of Remedies under U.S. Law 
It is generally stated that the recoverable remedies in the case of breach of contract is 
different from those in tort case because their aims of compensation differ from each other.  Such 
distinction may lead to the need of bringing concurrent tort claim. 
                                                          
78 See WINFIELD, supra note 62, at 449; see also CLERK & DUGDALE, Id. ¶¶ 17-07-08. 
79 See CLERK & DUGDALE, Id. ¶ 17-07; see also Torts (Interference with Goods) Act 1977, c. 32, 
§ 2(2) (Eng.). 
80 See WINFIELD, supra note 62, at 452; see also MURPHY, supra note 77, at 259. 
81 See CLERK & DUGDALE, supra note 61, ¶ 17-18; see also Sze Hai Tong Bank Ltd. v. Rambler 
Cycle Co. Ltd. [1959] AC 576 (appeal taken from Sing.). 
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1.1 Damages for Contract Liability 
 In general, contract law rejects to mandate the contracting party to perform his duty as he 
promises.82  Contract remedies are aimed at providing the relief to promisees who suffer from 
breach of contract.83  Therefore, the court generally provides the legal remedy which is a judicial 
remedy awarding a sum of money rather that giving the equitable remedy that is a judicial order 
either requiring specific performance or enjoining its nonperformance.84  This chapter will not 
look at the equitable remedies that are not usual under common law system in detail but will 
focus on the pecuniary damages that are the usual form of relief85 in order to compare with 
remedies in tort.  Generally speaking, when the breach of contract occurs, the court grants the 
non-breaching party a relief by awarding a sum of money intended to compensate for the harm 
to his interest.  To grant the recovery for types of damages available in contract claim, courts 
normally apply the appropriate measure of damages.  In such cases, the concept of efficient 
breach may be considered.  Additionally, courts will consider whether there are any limitations 
on damages that have an effect on the quantity of damages asked by the plaintiff. 
a. The Measures of Damages and Recoverable Remedies 
 Before looking at the types of damages available, we should consider the measures of 
damages that are usually applied in contract claim.  The measures of damages causing from 
breach of contract are in the forms of the protection of promisee’s expectation, reliance and 
                                                          
82 See FARNSWORTH ET AL., supra note 9, at 730. 
83 See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 730. 
84 See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 735. 
85 See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 739. 
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restitution interests.86  In order to protect expectation interest, the court tries to put the injured 
party in as good a position as it would have been in had the contract been performed.87  This 
measure of damage will give the injured party the benefits of its bargain that is measured based 
on the actual value.88  This kind of measurement requires the element of causation which is 
similar to the requirement of action in tort.  Thus, this element in contract requires the evidences 
showing that breach of contract is the cause in fact of all loss.89  In addition, the limitations on 
damages including the foreseeability, and certainty of loss are also considered.90  Because the 
limitations on damages may operate differently in the contract versus the tort context, this may 
lead to the plaintiff’s preferable choice in asserting his claim.  Alternatively, the court will 
protect the promisee’s reliance by putting the promisee back in the position in which such party 
would have been had the contract not been made.  This will occur when the promisee has 
changed position in reliance on the contract by incurring expenses in preparation or in 
performance.91  The reliance interest is ordinarily smaller than the expectation interest because 
the expectation interest includes both loss of profits and the reliance but the reliance interest 
includes nothing for lost profits.92  The reliance interest also requires the causation element.93  
                                                          
86 See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 46. 
87 See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 730. 
88 See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 730; see also L. L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The 
Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 1, 46 YALE L. J. 52 (1936-1937). 
89 See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 731; see also Wright v. St. Mary’s Med. Ctr., Inc., 59 F. Supp. 
2d 794 (S.D. Ind. 1999). 
90 See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 732; see also Wright, 59 F. Supp. 2d 794. 
91
 See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 732; see also Fuller & Perdue, supra note 88, at 52. 
92
 See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 733. 
93 See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 733. 
22 
 
The court sometimes recognized the restitution interest to the injured party in order to prevent 
unjust enrichment but not to enforce the promise.94  This damage category tries to put the 
breaching party back in the position in which such party would have been had the contract not 
been made.95  In other words, the injured party can recover all money or services that the 
breaching party has received before breaching the contract.96  The restitution interest is smaller 
than both expectation interest and reliance interest.97 
 As for the main measure of damage in protecting expectation interest, either in the case 
of total breach of contract or partial breach, the injured party may generally claim for loss of 
expectation interest including 1) loss in value; 2) other loss such as incidental and consequential 
damages.   
 A contract claim and a tort claim have a difference in the rights to type of damages.  For 
instance, the right to pure economic loss is allowed in a typical breach of contract while 
damages for pain and suffering or mental distress are recoverable in tort.  Punitive damages are 
available in tort but generally not in contract.  Apart from considering the measures of damages, 
we will also consider some types of damages that are mainly available in tort claim but such 
types are either restricted or refused in contract claim.  These types of damages are damages for 
mental or emotional distress, and punitive damages.  This can show that the plaintiff may choose 
to sue in tort rather than in contract in order to recover such types of damages.  In addition, the 
                                                          
94
 See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 733. 
95
 See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 733. 
96 See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 733. 
97 See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 734. 
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rights to pure economic loss, that is generally available in contract claim, will be explored as the 
concept of limiting the imposition of tort liability to the party. 
 Damages that result from mental distress are sometimes recoverable.  Contract law does 
not allow the recovery of emotional disturbance unless 1) the breach causes bodily harm or 2) 
even without bodily harm, “the contract or the breach is of such a kind that serious emotional 
disturbance was a particularly likely result.”98  Some courts also allow the recovery for mental 
distress in the case where the breach of contract amounts to a tort.99  
The right to punitive damage under contract law is severely restricted.  In general, courts 
will not award punitive damages intended to punish the breaching party because the main goal 
of contract remedy is to compensate the injured party for his expectation.100  Punitive damages 
may, however, be awarded in tort actions, and a number of courts have awarded them for a 
breach of contract that is tortious in some respects.101  Some courts impose punitive damages 
when the breach of contract is accompanied by an independent tort, at least if the conduct is 
sufficiently outrageous to justify such damages.102  However, when plaintiff’s right is limited to 
                                                          
98 See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 810; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 353 
(AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
99 See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 810; see also Chung v. Kaonohi Ctr. Co., 618 P.2d 283 (Haw. 
1980).  
100 See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 760. 
101
 See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 761; see also Cheney v. Palos Verdes Inv. Corp., 665 P.2d 661 
(Idaho 1983); Kuhn v. Coldwell Banker Landmark, Inc., 245 P.3d 992 (Idaho 2010). 
102
 See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 761; see also Excel Handbag Co. v. Edison Bros. Stores, Inc., 
630 F.2d 379 (5th Cir. 1980). 
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damages available in contract action because of the economic loss rule, punitive damage is not 
recoverable because plaintiff cannot recover tort damages.103   
 Notably, some court held that the characterization of the cause of action found in either 
breach of contract (breach of warranty) or negligence is not determined by the question as to 
whether the types of remedy sought are one that is available for contract of tort.104  Other courts 
held that the types of the remedy sought influences the court in determining the cause of action 
and the choice of applicable limitation period.105 
b. The Concept of Efficient Breach 
U.S. contract law recognizes an efficient breach.  That is to say that nonperformance is 
economically efficient when the benefits gained by the breaching party are greater than the value 
of the loss to the other party.106  Therefore, under economic analysis, nonperformance and its 
consequent reallocation of resources is socially desirable.107  It is important to consider the 
concept of efficient breach in U.S. contract law.  This is because this concept may have an 
influence on the scope of remedies granting to the plaintiff especially when the courts consider 
whether the punitive damages should be granted to the plaintiff.  Generally, punitive damages 
                                                          
103 See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, supra note 5, at 1080; see also Richard Swaebe v. Sears 
World Trade, 639 So. 2d 1120 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994); Tietsworth v. Harley-Davidson, Inc., 
677 N.W.2d 233 (Wis. 2004). 
104 CALVIN W. CORMAN, LIMITATION OF ACTIONS 199 (1991); see also W. Elec. Co. v. Brenner, 
41 N.Y.2d 291 (1977). 
105 See CORMAN, Id. at 199; see also Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Enco Assocs., 43 N.Y.2d 389 
(1977); Dantagnan v. I. L. A. Local 1418, 496 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1974). 
106 See FARNSWORTH ET AL., supra note 9, at 736. 
107 See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 736. 
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would not be awarded in breach of contract especially in efficient breach.108  In addition, it is 
possible that the doctrine of efficient breach may be taken into account in limiting the imposition 
of tort liability to the breaching party, in particular, in commercial transaction. 
c. The Limitations on Damages 
When the plaintiff claims for damages suffered from the defendant’s breach of contract, 
the court will consider what are the recoverable damages in contract case.  Moreover, plaintiff’s 
amount of damages available may be reduced because the recoverable damages are also 
subjected to the limitations such as those of avoidability, foreseeability and certainty.109 
Normally, the limitations on damages are taken into account in the process of considering the 
amount of recoverable damages.  Thus, the explanation of the different scope of remedies 
between contract claim and tort claim should be focused on the limitations on damages as well.  
Particularly, when it appears that such limitations may operate differently in the contract claim 
and tort claim.  There are three limitations on the recovery of damages for breach of contract 
including avoidability, foreseeability, and the requirement of certainty.110  All three limitations 
result in the reduction in the amount of damages recoverable under the general concept that 
protects the promisee’s expectation.111  Under the avoidability limitation, the injured party is 
precluded from recovering damages for any loss that he could take appropriate steps to avoid 
such loss.112  The party in breach generally has the burden of prove that the injured party does 
                                                          
108 See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 737. 
109 See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 764-66. 
110 See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 759-60. 
111 See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 760. 
112 See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 779. 
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not take appropriate steps to mitigate its loss.113  Under the limitation of foreseeability, if the 
party in breach, at the time of making the contract, did not have reason to foresee a probable loss 
that does not arise naturally from the breach – that is the consequential damage, such party is not 
liable for such damages.114  This reasonable contemplation requirement for the recovery of 
consequential damages restricts the scope of remedies that are allowed for breach of contract.  
The restriction of foreseeability is severer than that for the recovery of damages in tort claim 
which is upon the proximate cause test.115  Under uncertainty limitation, damages for breach of 
contract must be clearly proved with certainty and such damages cannot be merely left to 
speculation.116  Nevertheless, any breach gives the injured party a claim for damages.  This 
means that even though the injured party suffers from no loss or the amount of loss that is not 
prove with sufficient certainty, such party can recover at least nominal damages.117  In addition 
to this, the reasonable certainty is recognized in the recent decades.118  
                                                          
113 See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 780. 
114 See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 792-93; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 
351 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
115 See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 794; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 435 (AM. 
LAW INST. 1979).   
116 See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 800; see also Griffin v. Colver, 16 N.Y. 489 (1858). 
117 See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 757; see also Chung v. Kaonohi Ctr. Co., 618 P.2d 283 (Haw. 
1980). 
118 See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 800; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 352 
(AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
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Notably, the requirement of certainty for recover damages in breach of contract is still 
more strictly applied than that for recover damages in tort claim.119  
d. The Enforceability of Liquidated Remedy 
It is necessary to consider the validity and enforceability of the provision of liquidated 
damages.  This is because the amount of recoverable damages in contract claim may be limited 
by parties’ agreement on the relief for breach of contract.  Under U.S. contract law, the court 
gives the parties to the contract the power to agree about the relief for breach of contract.120  
However, their power to bargain over their right to remedies is limited.121  On one hand, if the 
parties have agreed that so large amount of damages are payable under their agreement, such 
agreement being categorized as “penalty” is denied under the law of remedies for breach of 
contract and the injured party is remitted to the conventional damage remedy.122  On the other 
hand, if the agreement of the remedial right is enforceable as liquidated damages, damages to the 
sum given are limited and the parties are bound by such agreement.123  It is acceptable that if the 
amount of damages is , at the time of contracting, reasonably stipulated in the light of the 
                                                          
119 See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 800; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 912 (AM. 
LAW INST. 1979).  
120 See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 810. 
121 See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 811. 
122 See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 811-13. 
123 See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 811-13. 
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anticipated or actual loss caused by the breach and of the difficulties of proving loss, such sum of 
damages is characterized as liquidated damages and enforceable.124 
Recently, the rule under U.S. system has not been clearly seen whether or not the 
provision of the liquidated damages excludes or limits the concurrent tortious liability. 
1.2 Damages for Tortious Liability 
a. The Measures of Damages and Recoverable Remedies 
As to the measures of damages, tort law has intended to compensate the injured person 
who suffers from legally recognized harms by awarding damages to the plaintiff against the 
defendant who is the wrongdoer.125  So the plaintiff’s primary goal is to be awarded the 
monetary damages as a compensation of harms suffered.126  In comparison to the type of 
damages recoverable in contract claim, the court is highly inclined to allow the damages for 
emotional distress and punitive damages in tort claim.  Damages for emotional distress are 
broadly recoverable when plaintiff establishes the right to recover for emotional harm as one 
item of damages under ordinary negligence action that also caused other physical injuries.127  A 
punitive damage is also allowed in some circumstances in order to deter further wrongful 
act,128for instance it is traditionally allowed when the defendant’s conduct is outrageous.129  
                                                          
124 See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 814; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 
(AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
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Claim for damages for pain, suffering, and emotional distress as well as punitive damages130 are 
allowed as the open-ended without any measurement.  While the plaintiff is likely to be awarded 
at large sums of money,131damages caps are imposed in some states.132  
 As to the recovery for economic loss, it is likely that the plaintiff’s rights to such loss are 
broadly protected in contract claim.  The right to economic loss is harshly restricted in tort 
action.  The economic loss is likely limited under the rule of negligence unless economic harm is 
an item of damages in negligence suit.133  In terms of pure economic loss, the court is likely to be 
concerned to preserve the role of contract and exclude the tort claim for pure economic loss.134  
Claim of negligence for pure economic loss is actionable in the case where the court held that 
there exists a special contractual relationship between parties such as the relationship between 
the lawyer and client so that defendant owned the duty of care to the plaintiff.135  This make the 
legal malpractice ordinarily treated as an economic tort that causes financial harm without injury 
to person or to property.136    
                                                                                                                                                                                           
129 See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, Id. at 862; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 
908 (AM. LAW INST. 1979); Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008). 
130 See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, Id. at 861. 
131 See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, Id. at 852. 
132 See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, Id. at 873-74. 
133 See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, Id. at 933. 
134 See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, Id. at 931, 933. 
135 See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, Id. at 933,1061; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: 
LIAB. FOR ECON. HARM §§ 1, 4-6 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 2012). 
136 See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, Id. at 1163; see also Meyers v. Livingston, Adler, Pulda, 
Meiklejohn & Kelly, P.C., 87 A.3d 534 (Conn. 2014). 
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In conclusion, the scope of damages awards in negligence case mainly comprise of 1) 
physical harm to person including pecuniary losses such as lost wages or lost earnings, medical 
expenses, pain and suffering as well as damages for emotional distress and 2) physical damages 
to tangible property.137  Significantly, all preceding damages would be awarded only if these 
damages meet the requirement of foreseeability.138  
Turning to consider the recoverable remedies in the tort of conversion, subject to the 
valid limitation on liability the parties have agreed, the plaintiff can recover for monetary 
damages at the market value of the goods at the time and place of conversion except for the case 
that the value of converted goods fluctuates.139  Additionally, damages for loss of use, 
consequential damages140, and punitive damages are allowed in conversion action.  Contrary to 
negligence case, when plaintiff cannot prove the actual damage in conversion case, the sums of 
nominal damages are also allowed.141  
b. The Limitations on Damages 
As being stated before, the limitations on damages have an effect on the amount of 
damages.  The relevant limitations on damages in tort claim are thus worthy of being considered 
                                                          
137 See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, Id. at 189, 857. 
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Vossoughi, 963 A.2d 1162 (D.C. 2009); C.A.R. Transp. Brokerage Co. v. Seay, 255 S.W.3d 445 
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in order to illustrate the different scope of remedies that has an influence on the plaintiff’s choice 
of tort claim rather than contract claim or vice versa.  The contributory negligence, plaintiff’s 
assumption of risk, and the mitigation of damages rule are concerned as the limitations.  In 
negligence case, in most states the defendant may raise the affirmative defense including either 
the plaintiff’s fault (comparative negligence) or plaintiff’s assumption of risk to reduce damage.  
Similarly, there is the mitigation of damages rule under tort law.142  This rule requires that the 
plaintiff should take the reasonable care or expenditure to avoid damages suffered.  The recovery 
for damages that could be avoided will be denied under this rule.143  And plaintiff can recover for 
any reasonable expenditure he incurs in mitigation of damages.144   
2. Scope of Remedies under English Law 
Similar to U.S. law, there exists a distinction on remedies in some respects between 
contract claim and tort claim.  The profound study on this distinction will lead to the 
understanding on concurrent claim under English law which is discussed in chapter five. 
2.1 Damages for Contract Liability 
 Under the general law of remedies for breach of contract, when the breach of contract 
occurs by one party, the other party has the right to terminate the contract in order to end the 
contractual relationship.145  When the party chooses to terminate the contract, such party can be 
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1991); Bryant v. Calantone, 286 N.J. Super. 362 (1996).  
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awarded damages for breach as well.146  Where one party commits a breach of contract, the 
injured party has a right to compensatory damages for the loss caused by the breach.147   
a. The Measures of Damages and Recoverable Remedies 
 The compensatory damages are normally in the form of a monetary damages and 
generally provided equivalent to the loss arising from the breach.148  Specific performance is 
allowed as an equitable remedy.149  Specific performance is unusual for a common law country 
so it is thought of as a secondary remedy to compensatory damages under English law.150  
Considering the measures of damages, contract law on remedies aims at putting the injured party 
into as good a position as when the contract had been performed to protect the injured party’s 
expectation interest.151  Alternatively, the injured party can seek for the reliance damages instead 
of the expectation interest to reach the overall aim of compensatory damages.152   
 In terms of recoverable remedies under English contract law, compensatory damages are 
generally concerned to compensate pecuniary loss while the non-pecuniary loss such as “mental 
                                                          
146 See BURROWS, Id. at 111. 
147 See BURROWS, Id. at 120. 
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distress” is not recoverable.153  However, personal injury such as damages for pain and suffering 
can be awarded even though the plaintiff almost always seeks for such damages in tort.154 
 The mental distress for breach of contract claim has been allowed by the court in some 
exceptional cases where the mental satisfaction is an important object of the contract155  It 
appears that the court applies the approach that considers the mental satisfaction being as the 
important object of the contract to allow the mental distress in the case where the claim was 
brought against the defendant both in contract and tortious negligence.156   
 The recovery for economic loss is normally based on contract claim.  The remoteness test 
is also required and based on the kind of loss that is in the defendant’s reasonable contemplation.  
It is held that the contemplation of economic loss in contract claim required a greater degree of 
probability than the foresight test in tort.157 
 Punitive damages cannot be awarded for breach of contract under English contract law.158 
This is contrary to tort law that allows punitive damages where the facts meet the requirements 
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imposed in Rookes v. Barnard [1964] AC 1129 (HL).  For example, the punitive damages could 
be awarded in case where the defendant has calculated to make a profit for himself which greatly 
exceed the compensation payable to the plaintiff.159 
b. The Limitations on Damages 
There are also the limits on compensatory damages.160  The defendant has the burden of 
proof on the limitations of compensatory damages.161  The first one of limits is the remoteness 
restriction.162  If, at the time the contract was made, the defendant has not been reasonably 
contemplated whatever type of loss as a serious possibility, that kind of loss is too remote.163  
Second, the defendant is not responsible for the loss where an intervening cause either a natural 
event,  a third party’s conduct or the plaintiff’s conduct breaks the chain of causation.164  This 
means that the intervening cause is much more responsible for loss than the defendant’s 
breach.165  Third, the plaintiff is required to take reasonable steps to mitigate damages.166  If the 
plaintiff fails to take the reasonable steps to minimize the loss, he cannot  recover such 
damages.167  Forth, the law on contributory negligence is, in practice,  applied as the limitation of 
damages for breach of contract as a matter of statutory interpretation of the Law Reform 
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(Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 which raised by courts.168  In addition, contributory 
negligence is applicable to the case where the breach of contractual duty of care also 
simultaneously meet the requirement of the independent tort of negligence.169  In particular, in 
the case of concurrent liability in contract and tort, it is submitted that the plaintiff should not be 
able to avoid the contributory rule by choosing to assert contract claim.170  As a result, damages 
will be reduced, not eliminated, “to such extent as the court thinks just and equitable having 
regard to the plaintiff’s share in the responsibility for the damage.”171 
c. The Enforceability of Liquidated Remedy 
 Similar to the U.S. contract law the validity and enforceability of the provision of 
liquidated damages may affect the amount of recoverable damages in contract claim.  It thus 
important to consider whether the agreement on the sum of money being the damages payable is 
valid and enforceable or not.  Under English contract law, parties are allowed to include a term 
in the contract in order to stipulate for the sum of money to be the damages payable in the case of 
breach.172  Such term is enforceable as the “liquidated damages” if it is not the penalty.  The 
stipulated sum of damages is not a penalty if it is, in the time of contracting, estimated to protect 
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a legitimate interest of the plaintiff and it does not exceed all proportion to such interest.173  It is 
noteworthy that where the breaching party is a consumer, the stipulated term may be invalid if it 
is considered to be unfair under the Consumer Rights Act 2015.174 
2.2 Damages for Tortious Liability 
a. The Measures of Damages and Recoverable Remedies 
Tort law aims at compensation so that the rules on damage try to “put the plaintiff in the 
position he would have been in had the tort not been committed.”175  Hence, the remedy in tort 
rule generally provides an award of unliquidated damages.176  While tort law protects the wide 
range of interest against the wrongfully conduct, the compensatory damage is particularly 
focused for tort negligence.177  Significantly, personal interests such as the rights to bodily 
integrity, personal liberty, physical security from injury, psychiatric harm and distress are mainly 
protected by either intentional tort, negligence and strict liability in many cases.178  Property 
interest such as the rights to possession, physical damage to property are also protected by both 
intentional tort, such as conversion, and negligence.179  
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Claims for personal injury are mostly available in tortious action but they can also be 
recoverable in claims for breach of contract.180  Taking damages in medical negligence cases as 
an example, in general, the court applies the measure of damage in claim for personal injury to 
the medical cases.  Damages for mental distress is also revocable in some circumstances.181  
Moreover, there is the view that damages for mental distress should be awarded both in tort 
claim and breach of contract claim although courts have traditionally been reluctant in awarding 
mental distress for breach of contract.182   
According to English law, it is generally clear that it is insufficient for plaintiff to recover 
damages if he suffers only economic loss arising from defendant’s negligent conduct.183  
However, pure economic loss resulting from negligent conduct is also protected by tort law in 
some situations.  The recovery of damages for pure economic loss in tort claim has restricted and 
then has developed through the tort of negligent misrepresentation case that allowing the 
recovery of pure economic loss.184  In Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd. v. Heller & Partners Ltd. [1964] 
AC 465 (HL), court allowed the recovery for wasted expenditure in negligent misrepresentation 
action because the special relationship between the plaintiff and defendant created the 
                                                          
180 See BURROWS, supra note 151, at 269, 325; see also Giambrone & Ors v. Sunworld Holidays 
Ltd. [2004] EWCA Civ 158 (appeal taken form Eng.). 
181 See CLERK & DUGDALE, supra note 61, ¶ 10-95. 
182 See BURROWS, supra note 151, at 324; see also Addis v. Gramophone Co. Ltd. [1909] AC 
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defendant’s duty to safeguard the plaintiff’s economic interest.185  And after Hedley Byrne’s 
case, in some limited situations, there are the recognitions that the plaintiff can recover for pure 
economic loss arising from the acts or omissions under the tort of negligence.186  For instance, it 
is common that where the solicitor negligently provides services to the client, the client can 
recover for the loss of chance of litigating of recovering compensation.187  So, the requirement of 
special relationship is needed to award pure economic loss in tort claim.188  However, when the 
defendant asserted the tort claim for economic loss arising from the defendant’s breach of 
contract, it is arguable that the court should apply the narrower contractual test of remoteness in 
order to grant the right to such damages.189  
Considering the recoverable remedies for conversion case, the Torts (Interference with 
Goods) Act 1977 Section 3 provides that the plaintiff can ask for either form of relief as 
followed: 
“(a) an order for delivery of the goods, and for payment of any consequential 
damages, or 
(b) an order for delivery of the goods, but giving the defendant the alternative of 
paying damages by reference to the value of the goods, together in either 
alternative with payment of any consequential damages, or 
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(c) damages.”  
Punitive damages are restrictively awarded in only two classes of case to punish the 
defendant and to deter him from the same conduct in the future.190  The first is that the punitive 
damages are recoverable where there is the “oppressive, arbitrary or unconstitutional action by 
servants of the Government.”191  Secondly, in the case “where the defendant’s conduct  has been 
calculated by him to make a profit for himself which may well exceed the compensation payable 
to the plaintiff,” the court will allow the punitive damages.192  
b. The Limitations on Damages 
The recovery for damages in tort claim is under some limitations such as the test of 
remoteness, duty of mitigation and contributory negligence.  First, the test of remoteness as a 
causation requirement is considered to limit damages for which the defendant is responsible.193  
If damages would not normally be anticipated or such damages occurred in an unusual way, that 
type of damage is considered to remote and then the defendant is not held responsible.  As can be 
seen, the rules on remoteness are traditionally more advantageous to the plaintiffs in tort than in 
contract.194  Second, it is excepted that the amount of recoverable damages is also governed by 
the rule of mitigation of damage that requires the plaintiff to mitigate his loss by taking 
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reasonable steps on his part.195  Third, the recoverable damage may be reduced under the rule of 
contributory negligence.  The Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 Section 1(1) 
provides that the fault of the person suffering damage will lead to the reduction of damages 
recoverable.  The court will consider the extent of the plaintiff’s share in the responsibility for 
damages to make the just and equitable decision.196 
C. Limitation of Action 
 Both contract claim and tort claim are subject to their own rule of limitation period.  It 
appears in most concurrent cases that the plaintiff prefer tort claim to contract claim because of 
the longer limitation period.  It is thus important to explore the different rules of limitation period 
that are applicable to either tort claim or contract claim in order to find the answer to the question 
as to whether the courts allow the plaintiff to rely on tort claim because of the longer limitation 
period.   
When the plaintiff fails to bring lawsuit within the period of time required, his claim will 
generally be barred by the statute of limitations and dismissed.  The court enforces the limitation 
period that is agreed by the parties although it is shorter than the period that specified by the 
applicable statute of limitations if such period is reasonable.197  However, the agreed period that 
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is longer than the limitation period legislatively fixed is held void because this is contrary to 
public policy.198 
1. Statute of Limitations under U.S. Law 
 In general, the breach of contract cause of action is likely to have a different limitation 
period in comparison to the tort claim.199  Characterizing cause of action between contract and 
tort will affect the determination of the limitation period.  There are different either federal and 
state statutes of limitations which have limited different periods of time both in contract and tort 
cause of actions.  In Hutchinson v. Smith, 417 So. 2d 926 (Miss. 1982), the court recognized that 
where the plaintiff has more than one legal remedy (remedy both in contract and tort), he may 
choose to seek the remedy that is more beneficial as to the view of the applicable limitation 
period.200  So plaintiff’s pleading and the form of action may dictate the applicable limitation 
period.201  As it appeared in the legal malpractice actions, some courts have applied the tort 
statute of limitations to the legal malpractice action when the plaintiff’s complaint sounds in tort 
although the claim could be brought in contract.202  
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 Normally, the significant issue of limitation period for the court to be determined is the 
issue of the starting date of the limitation period.  This is because the statutes frequently state that 
the period begins to run when the plaintiff’s cause of action accrues.  To determine at what point 
of accrual to begin with is interpreted by the court, in particular, in the case where the 
wrongdoing and the resulting injury are not simultaneous.203  In doing so, the court will consider 
the different rules amongst “(1) the occurrence of the legal violation ( the occurrence rule), (2) 
the resulting damage (the damage rule), and (3) the awareness of the resulting harm and its 
causation (the discovery rule).”204  Especially, if the discovery rule is applied to the action, the 
shorter limitation period may not be barred.  Conversely, the longer period may be time barred 
because of the earlier date of the commencement that is applied by the occurrence rule. 
1.1 The Statute of Limitations for a Breach of Contract Claim 
Many jurisdictions have the written-contract limitations statutes that usually run four to 
six years except for a few states that provide the much longer period.205  For instance, the 
Uniform Commercial Code § 2-725 provides that the written contract for sale of goods runs for 
four years after the cause of action accrues.  So when the seller is in breach of express or implied 
warranty under contract for sale of goods, the UCC § 2-725 is the applicable limitation period in 
particular to the economic loss arising from the defective product.206  Some courts reason that 
UCC 2-725 is properly applied to the breach of implied warranty because such breach is created 
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by Article 2 of Uniform Commercial Code.207  On the contrary, other courts focus on the strict 
tort liability of the personal injury defective product litigation and select to apply the personal 
injury or tort statute of limitations.208  The personal injury or tort statute of limitations is also 
apply in an action brought against the constructor when the personal injury arising from the 
breach of construction contract even though there are separate statutes of repose for 
improvements to real estate.209   
Unwritten or implied-contract limitations statute usually provides the shorter period than 
that is provided for the written contracts.210   
Some courts interpret that the cause of action for breach of contract accrues on the date of 
the breach.211  Taking breach of warranty case as another example, if the plaintiff brings the suit 
claiming breach of warranty, the accrual commences when the seller tenders delivery of goods 
although the seller does not know the breach.212  Additionally, the parties to a contract may agree 
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Corp., 626 F.2d 280 (3d Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Hockessin Tractor, Inc., 420 A.2d 154 (Del. 
1980); Stumler v. Ferry-Morse Seed Co., 644 F.2d 667 (7th Cir. 1981); see also U.C.C. § 2-725 
(AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002). 
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upon a shortened contractual limitations period to replace a statute of limitations, as long as it is 
reasonable.213 
1.2 The Statute of Limitations for Tort Claim 
 The time limitations for tort claim vary from state to state.214  In negligence cause of 
action, the plaintiff is often required to commence the claim within two or three years from the 
date the cause of action accrues.215    
 Regarding cause of action in tort, the beginning of the limitation period depends on the 
occurrence of the harm.216  Some courts recognized the damage rule that requires the actual 
damages as the essential element of a negligence cause of action.217  In other words, all elements 
necessary to the cause of action, such as tort of legal malpractice claim,218 must occur in order to 
maintain the claim.219  So the tort cause of action traditionally accrues when damages occur.220  
In addition, the concept of continuing wrong may postpone the time of accrual of the cause of 
                                                          
213 Zerjal v. Daech & Bauer Constr., Inc., 939 N.E.2d 1067 (Ill. 2010). 
214 See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, supra note 5, at 427. 
215 See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, Id. at 427. 
216 See CORMAN, supra note 104, at 376; see also Siegel Oil Co. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 701 F.2d 149 
(Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1983). 
217 See CORMAN, Id. at 376; see also Davies v. Krasna, 535 P.2d 1161 (Cal. 1975); United States 
v. Gutterman, 701 F.2d 104 (9th Cir. 1983); Stuard v. Jorgenson, 150 Idaho 701, 249 P.3d 1156 
(2011). 
218 See CORMAN, Id. at 561; see also Jepson v. Stubbs, 555 S.W.2d 307 (Mo. 1977); Woodburn v. 
Turley, 625 F.2d 589 (5th Cir. 1980); Shideler v. Dwyer, 275 Ind. 270, 417 N.E.2d 281 (1981); 
McConico v. Romeo, 561 So. 2d 523 (Ala. 1990). 
219 See CORMAN, Id. at 526. 
220 See CORMAN, Id. at 526; see also Premium Mgmt., Inc. v. Walker, 648 F.2d 778 (1st Cir. 
1981); Pioneer Nat’l Title Ins. Co. v. Andrews, 652 F.2d 439 (5th Cir. 1981); Norris v. 
Grosvenor Mktg., Ltd., 803 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1986). 
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action in tort while this concept does not apply to action for breach of contract.221  These can 
explain why the time limited for tortious action may expire later than that of the contractual 
claim.  However, when the plaintiff’s claim involves intentional tort, the limitation period begins 
to run at the date of wrong act because the damage is not the essential elements of actions.222  
Remarkably, the discovery rule also be adopted to determine the beginning point of the 
limitation period in case of the claim for the latent injury223 and the action in tort of medical 
malpractice224 as well as legal malpractice.225 
 The characterization of claim has affected the plaintiff’s right to relief in respect of time 
limitations specially in concurrent claim.  The court at times held that the action sounds in tort by 
looking at the gravamen of the action even though the plaintiff makes an attempt to allege breach 
of contract in order to get the benefit of the longer limitation period.226  However, the court also 
considered the nature of the contractual obligation to apply the contract statute of limitations to 
                                                          
221 See CORMAN, Id. at 487. 
222 See CORMAN, Id. at 529; see also E. J. Spires, Annotation, Scope of Limitation Statutes 
Specifically Governing Assault and Battery, 90 A.L.R.2d 1230 (1963). 
223 See CORMAN, Id. at 534.  
224 See CORMAN, Id. at 549; see also Nardone v. Reynolds, 333 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 1976); Teller v. 
Schepens, 411 N.E.2d 464 (Mass. 1980); Oliver v. Kaiser Cmty. Health Found., 5 Ohio St. 3d 
111, 449 N.E.2d 438 (1983); Long v. Jaszczak, 688 N.W.2d 173 (N.D. 2004); see also David P. 
Chapus, Annotation, Medical Malpractice: Statute of Limitations in Wrongful Death Action 
Based on Medical Malpractice, 70 A.L.R.4th 535 (1989); Sara L. Johnson, Annotation, Medical 
Malpractice: Applicability of “Foreign Object” Exception in Medical Malpractice Statutes of 
Limitations, 50 A.L.R.4th 250 (1986); see also DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, supra note 5, at 
430. 
225 See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, Id. at 1180; see also Vastano v. Algeier, 178 N.J. 230, 837 
A.2d 1081 (2003); Bank of N.Y. v. Sheff, 854 A.2d 1269 (Md. 2004); Guest v. McLaverty, 332 
Mont. 421, 138 P.3d 812 (2006); Bleck v. Power, 955 A.2d 712 (D.C. 2008). 
226 See CORMAN, supra note 104, at 333; see also Equilease Corp. v. State Fed. Sav. & Laon 
Asso., 647 F.2d 1069 (10th Cir. 1981). 
46 
 
the action claiming for damage caused by defendant’s negligent failure to perform duties arising 
out of a contract.227   
2. Statute of Limitations under English Law 
 The question as to whether the plaintiff’s cause of action is barred by limitation period is 
govern by the Limitation Act 1980.  The action is barred if the plaintiff does not commence his 
claim for the right to remedies within the fixed period of time.228  In such situation the plaintiff 
has the burden of proving that his claim is asserted within the limitation period.229  
2.1 The Statute of Limitations for a Breach of Contract Claim 
 It is imposed that “An action founded on simple contract shall not be brought after the 
expiration of six years from the date on which the cause of action accrued.”230  A contract made 
by deed is referred to a “specialty” under the Limitation Act 1980 Section 8(1) and the twelve 
years of limitation period is applied.231  These general limitation periods are subject to numerous 
exceptions such as the extension of limitation period in case of disability232 or the postponement 
of limitation period in case of concealment of the facts relevant to the plaintiff’s right of 
action.233  However, it is generally accepted that the parties are allowed to set their own 
                                                          
227 See CORMAN, Id. at 337; see also Steiner v. Wenning, 373 N.E.2d 366 (N.Y. 1977); Wright v. 
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 355 So. 2d 353 (Ala. 1978). 
228 See BURROWS, supra note 45, at 159. 
229 See CLERK & DUGDALE, supra note 61, ¶ 33-03. 
230 Limitation Act 1980, c. 58, § 5 (Eng.). 
231 See BURROWS, supra note 45, at 159; see also Limitation Act 1980, c. 58, § 8(1) (Eng.). 
232 Limitation Act 1980, c. 58, § 28 (Eng.).  
233 Limitation Act 1980, c. 58, § 32 (Eng.). 
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limitation periods and the starting point of period of time as a term of contract.234 The contractual 
term of limitation period is valid but the term is subject to the general law on validity 
particularly, under the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 and the Consumer Rights Act 2015.235  
Generally, the date of the commencement for breach of contract action is the date of the breach 
of the contract even if no loss has been suffered at that date.236  
2.2 The Statute of Limitations for Tort Claim 
It is provided that “An action founded on tort shall not be brought after the expiration of 
six years from the date on which the cause of action accrued”237  While the cause of action 
accrues at the date of defendant’s wrongful act in the case of tort actionable per se, in the case of 
negligence which is actionable only on the proof of damage, the cause of action accrues at the 
time the damage actually occurs.238   
In addition, the period of three years is the special time limit for actions in respect of 
personal injuries.  The rule states that this three-year period is applicable to  
“any action for damages for negligence, nuisance or breach of duty (whether the 
duty exists by virtue of a contract or of provision made by or under a statute or 
independently of any contract or any such provision) where the damages claimed 
by the plaintiff for the negligence, nuisance or breach of duty consist of or include 
damages in respect of personal injuries to the plaintiff or any other person.”239   
                                                          
234 See BURROWS, supra note 45, at 162. 
235 See BURROWS, Id. at 162. 
236 See BURROWS, Id. at 160; see also JOSEPH CHITTY, CHITTY ON CONTRACTS ¶ 28-032 (H.G. 
Beale 32nd ed. London: Sweet & Maxwell: Thomson Reuters, 2015). 
237 Limitation Act 1980, c. 58, § 2 (Eng.). 
238 See CLERK & DUGDALE, supra note 61, ¶ 33-09; see also Cartledge v. E Jopling & Sons Ltd. 
[1963] AC 758 (HL) (appeal taken from Eng.). 
239 Limitation Act 1980, c. 58, § 11 (Eng.).  
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The period of three years begins to run from “(a) the date on which the cause of action 
accrued; or (b) the date of knowledge (if later) of the person injured.”240  
In case of negligence cause of action for recover any form of latent damage, the action 
shall not be brought after either six years from the date which cause of action accrues or three 
years from the date on which the plaintiff had the knowledge of certain facts required for 
bringing an action for damages if this period expires later.241  Importantly, the latent damage 
provisions contained in Section 14A of the Limitation Act 1980 only apply to tort claims. 
Furthermore, there is the time limit for negligence actions not involving personal injuries 
whether or not the plaintiff is aware of damages.242  Limitation Act 1980 Section 14B provides 
that: 
“an action for damages for negligence, other than one to which section 11 of the 
Limitation Act 1980 applies, shall not be brought after the expiration of fifteen 
years from the date (or, if more than one, from the last of the dates) on which 
there occurred any act or omission--(a) which is alleged to constitute negligence; 
and (b) to which the damage in respect of which damages are claimed is alleged 
to be attributable (in whole or in part).”243   
In general, regarding the date of commencement, the accrual of negligence cause of 
action accrues at the date on which the negligent conduct has caused damage whereas the cause 
of action for breach of contract accrues when the contract is broken.  Due to the difference of the 
date of accrual of contract and tort action, the plaintiff may have a longer limitation period in tort 
                                                          
240 Limitation Act 1980, c. 58, § 11(4) (Eng.).  
241 See CLERK & DUGDALE, supra note 61, ¶ 33-11; see also Limitation Act 1980, c. 58, § 14A 
(Eng.).  
242 See CLERK & DUGDALE, Id. ¶ 33-11. 
243 Limitation Act 1980, c. 58, § 14B (Eng.).  
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than in contract.244  It is true even if in the case of bailment claim.  To illustrate, where there is a 
breach of bailment contract, if the plaintiff sues in wrongful conversion as for a tort, the six years 
runs from the date of demand and refusal but if the plaintiff sues in contract, the six years runs 
forthwith from the breach of contract.245   
In conclusion, with comparison to the statute of limitation under breach of contract claim, 
in some certain types of tort claim, the plaintiff has a longer limitation period for commencing 
his claim.  This may be because the statutory limitation is longer.  Or it may be because the 
occurrence of the cause of action in tort occurs later than that of contractual action.  Or it may be 
because of the application of the limitation period for latent damages.246  As can be seen, in most 
concurrent cases the plaintiffs choose to rely on the tort claim when the contractual claim is 
barred by statutes of limitation.  
D. The Effect of Exculpatory Clause 
In some situations, it is unacceptable to allow the plaintiffs suing in tort when the contract 
action is not available in particular where there appears either the express or implied term of a 
contract between plaintiff and defendant to exclude contractual liability or there is an express 
disclaimer by the defendant.  In such situations, the issues of interpretation and statutory validity 
arise both for contractual terms and disclaimers.  If the exculpatory clause or disclaimer is valid, 
this will raise the policy question as to whether we should let the plaintiff makes a claim in tort 
                                                          
244 See BURROWS, supra note 45, at 160; see also See CLERK & DUGDALE, supra note 61, ¶ 33-16. 
245 HENRY THOMAS BANNING, THE LAW OF THE LIMITATION OF ACTIONS: TOGETHER WITH SOME 
OBSERVATIONS ON THE EQUITABLE DOCTRINES OF LACHES (OR DELAY) AND ACQUIESCENCE 70 
(Archibald Brown 3rd ed., 1906).  
246 Latent Damage Act 1986, c. 37 (Eng.). 
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when it is apparent that he chooses to assert tort claim to avoid an exculpatory clause or a 
disclaimer that he agreed to in a contract.  It might be that courts will not assist a plaintiff who 
was not vulnerable or dependent, but whose relationship and bargaining position with the 
defendant gave the opportunity for negotiation of a contractual term to cover the issue, but the 
plaintiff did not take it.  It is noteworthy that the preliminary question arises whether the 
exculpatory clause of the disclaimer is valid.  To answer such question, it is thus necessary to 
consider the U.S. and English law with regard to the validity of exculpatory clause for both 
contractual claims and tort ones. 
 1. The Validity of Exculpatory Clause under U.S. Law 
1.1 The Exclusion of Contractual Liability 
 In general, parties are free to make the agreements as they wish, and the court will 
enforce them without passing on their substance.247  However, the court may decide that the 
interest in party autonomy is outweighed by some other interest, especially public policy, and 
will refuse to enforce the agreement or some terms of it.248  When the court refuses to enforce an 
agreement on grounds of public policy, the court may hold  that part of the agreement is 
enforceable though another part of it is not.249   
 The contract terms may be governed by the concept of unconscionability that is one of 
the public policy concerns.  Uniform Commercial Code Article 2 (UCC 2-302) deals with 
unconscionable contracts and terms of the contracts.  This rule of unconscionability has wisely 
                                                          
247 See FARNSWORTH ET AL., supra note 9, at 313.  
248 See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 313; see also Lucier v. Williams, 366 N.J. Super. 485, 841 
A.2d 907 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004). 
249 See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 314.  
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applied, either by analogy or as an expression of a general doctrine, to many other kinds of 
contracts, including contracts that fall under other articles of the Code.250  The Restatement 
Second of Contracts contains a section on unconscionability patterned after the Code’s and 
applicable to contracts generally.  This general rule provides that:  
 “If a contract or term thereof is unconscionable at the time the contract is made a 
court may refuse to enforce the contract, or may enforce the remainder of the 
contract without the unconscionable term, or may so limit the application of any 
unconscionable term as to avoid any unconscionable result.”251  
 The parties sometimes agree to incorporate the provisions to exclude or limit their 
contractual liability that amounts to tortious liability.252  It is submitted that a party cannot 
exempt itself from liability in tort for harm that it causes intentionally or recklessly.253  
However, a party generally can exempt itself from liability or limit its liability in tort for harm 
cause by negligence, so long as the provision is not unconscionable.254  In exceptional cases, 
however, courts have held such an agreement unenforceable because the agreement affects the 
public interest and the other party is a member of the protected class.  For example, first, an 
employer cannot exempt itself from liability in negligence to it employee.255  Second, a common 
carrier or a public utility cannot exempt itself from liability in negligence to one it has 
                                                          
250 See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 298-99. 
251 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
252 Zerjal v. Daech & Bauer Constr., Inc., 939 N.E.2d 1067 (Ill. 2010). 
253 See FARNSWORTH ET AL., supra note 9, at 320; see also Martin Marietta Corp. v. Int’l 
Telecomms. Satellite Org., 991 F.2d 94 (4th Cir. 1992). 
254 See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 320; see also O’Callaghan v. Waller & Beckwith Realty Co., 
155 N.E.2d 545 (Ill. 1958). But see U.C.C. § 1-302 (b) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 
2001) (“The obligations of good faith, diligence, reasonableness, and care prescribed by [the 
Uniform Commercial Code] may not be disclaimed by agreement.”). 
255 See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 320; see also Pittsburgh, C., C. & S. L. Ry. Co. v. Kinney, 115 
N.E. 505 (Ohio 1916). 
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contracted to serve in that capacity, although it may be allowed to limit its liability to a 
reasonable agreed value in return for a lower rate.256  Therefore, when the court found that the 
contract contains an exculpatory clause that is unenforceable on grounds of public policy, the 
court inclines to refuse to enforce such term. 257  As a result, the court will generally enforce the 
rest of the agreement. 
1.2 The Exclusion of Tortious Liability 
The parties to the contract can agree to bear the risk of injury although such risk is caused 
by the other’s negligent conduct.258  However, any forms of the exemptions of tort liability such 
as disclaimer of responsibility, a release or exculpatory agreement may be unenforceable because 
of the laws of contract enforceability,259 public policy,260 or other state laws.261  Some states 
consider a release to be void if such release attempts to waive liability for grossly negligent, 
                                                          
256 See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 320; see also Curtiss-Wright Flying Serv., Inc. v. Glose, 66 
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257 See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 346. 
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159 Cal. App. 4th 1476, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 471 (2008); Deuley v. DynCorp Int’l, Inc., 8 A.3d 1156 
(Del. 2010), cert. denied, 563 U.S. 938, 131 S. Ct. 2119 (2011).  
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App. 4th 1281, 66 Cal. Rptr. 3d 704 (2007). 
260 See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, Id. at 411; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 
496B (AM. LAW INST. 1979); Vodopest v. MacGregor, 913 P.2d 779 (Wash.1996); Yauger v. 
Skiing Enters., 206 Wis. 2d 76, 557 N.W.2d 60 (1996); Gavin W. v. YMCA of Metro. L.A., 106 
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261 See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, Id. at 409; see also Hargis v. Baize, 168 S.W.3d 36 (Ky. 
2005); Finch v. Inspectech, Ltd. Liab. Co., 229 W. Va. 147, 727 S.E.2d 823 (2012). 
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reckless, or intentional conduct.262  In addition, the exculpatory clause that attempts to exclude 
liability for negligence must be explicitly stated in contract.263   
2. The Validity of Exculpatory Clause under English Law 
2.1 The Exclusion of Contractual Liability 
It is important to consider the validity of the exculpatory clause since this kind of 
exclusion of contractual liability has greatly affected the imposition of tortious duty of care under 
English law.  As for the enforceability of the exemption clauses, if such clauses are included in 
contract between the parties who one of them is not consumer- that is the business to business 
contracts, this contract is governed by the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977.264  This act is 
generally being applied to the business liability in the case of both contract and tort, except for 
contract for the sale of goods or hire-purchase.265  This act imposes the rule to restrict the parties’ 
right to exclude or limit their liabilities if such liabilities is subject to the act.  For example, the 
party cannot agree to exclude or limit liability for death or personal injury arising out of breach 
of any contractual obligation to take reasonable care, or breach of any duty of care in tort.266  
Another restriction is that the party cannot exclude or limit liability for damages other than death 
or personal injury, unless the contract term satisfies the reasonableness requirement.267  In 
                                                          
262 See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, Id. at 410; see also Tayar v. Camelback Ski Corp., 47 A.3d 
1190 (Pa. 2012). 
263 See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, Id. at 411; see also Donahue v. Ledgends, Inc., 331 P.3d 
342 (Alaska 2014). 
264 See BURROWS, supra note 45, at 98. 
265 Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, c. 50, §§ 1(3),6(4) (Eng.). 
266 Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, c. 50, § 2(1) (Eng.). 
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addition, when one of the contracting parties deals on the other’s written standard terms of 
business, the other party cannot by reference to contract term exclude or limit his liability in 
relation to his breach of contract, unless such contract term satisfies the requirement of 
reasonableness.268  According to a requirement of reasonableness, the question arises as to 
whether the term  is “a fair and reasonable one to be included having regard to the circumstances 
which were, or ought reasonably to have been, known to or in the contemplation of the parties 
when the contract was made.”269  The party who claims the exemption clause has the duty of 
proving the reasonableness of that contract term.270  
 Turning to consider the enforceability of exemption term included in consumer contracts, 
the rules of the Consumer Rights Act 2015 are applied in invalidating the exemption clauses.  
For instance, a trader cannot exclude or limit liability for death or personal injury that arises from 
breach of an express or implied contractual obligation to use reasonable care in a consumer 
contract, or from breach of a duty of care in tort.271  The other exclusion of liability is also 
governed by the Consumer Rights Act 2015 Section 62 that generally governs any unfair term of 
a consumer contract.  The unfair term is not binding on the consumer if it causes a significant 
imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations under the contract to the detriment of the 
consumer.272  However, Section 62 does not affect the operation of: 1) exclusion of liability: 
                                                          
268 Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, c. 50, § 3(1), (2) (Eng.).  
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271 Consumer Rights Act 2015, c. 15, § 65 (Eng.). 
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goods contracts; 273 2) exclusion of liability: digital content contracts274 and 3) exclusion of 
liability: services contracts.275 
 It has been considered that imposing tortious duty of care owed by the contracting party 
will be inconsistent with the contractual terms if the exculpatory clause is valid under either the 
Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 or the Consumer Rights Act 2015 as the case may be.  In this 
case the court will not allow the concurrent tort claim in such situation. 
2.2 The Exclusion of Tortious Liability 
In general, under the doctrine of volenti non fit injuria, the express or implied agreement 
between the plaintiff and defendant to release the defendant’s responsibility is enforceable if they 
have agreed before the act of negligence occurs.276  Nevertheless, the agreement that resolves the 
defendant from legal responsibility of his negligent conduct is treated as the exculpatory clause 
that falls within the restriction of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 Section 2.  This act 
imposes the rule to restrict the parties’ right to exclude or limit their liabilities if such liabilities 
are subject to this act such as liability for death or personal injury arising out of breach of any 
duty of care in tort or liability for damages other than death or personal injury that does not 
satisfy the reasonableness requirement.277  In addition, there is the prohibition on exclusions 
from liability under the Consumer Protection Act 1987 Section 7278 which provides that the 
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275 Consumer Rights Act 2015, c. 15, § 57 (Eng.).  
276 See CLERK & DUGDALE, supra note 61,  ¶¶ 3-80-81; see also Nettleship v. Weston [1971] 2 
QB 691 (CA) (appeal taken from Eng.). 
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liability to a person who has suffered damage caused wholly or partly by a defect in a product 
shall not be limited or excluded by any means including contract term, notice or provision. 
E. Summary 
Indeed, most rules and principles of either contract law or tort law of U.S. and English 
systems are quite similar.  However, U.S. laws may vary from state to state while English 
jurisdiction will apply the same laws to any disputes occur in such jurisdiction.  Apart from 
English common law, English legislative branch also develops some laws in relation to both 
contract and tort in the form of statutory laws such as Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 
1999, Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, Limitation Act 1980, Law Reform (Contributory 
Negligence) Act 1945, and Consumer Protection Act 1987 etc.  These legislative laws have 
influenced on the occurrence of concurrent issues and affected the recognition of the concurrent 
tort claims in English Jurisdiction.  Although U.S. legislatures do not enact so much statutory 
laws in the fields of contract and tort law, the issue of concurrent claims has been prevailing 
throughout the U.S jurisdictions.  Also, the recognition of concurrent tort claims has been 
affected by U.S. common law of contract and tort law.  The plausible reasons why the plaintiffs 
have a preference for tort claim over contract claim or vice versa would be the differences 
between contract and tort law in each legal system which could affect the more advantageous 
rights granted to them.  As to forgoing explanation, all reasons could be (1) broader scope of 
remedies; (2) more favorable limitations period; (3) getting around a lack of privity; (4) getting 
around an exculpatory clause. 
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III. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CONCURRENT CLAIM 
This Chapter will illustrate the development of contract law and tort law in relation to the 
concurrent situation as in general in common law legal system throughout the period of time.   
In English jurisdictions, at the beginning of the second half of the 20th century until the 
recognition of concurrent liability in Henderson v. Merrett Syndicates Ltd. [1995] 2 AC 145 
(HL) 185, it seems that courts adopted something very like the French’s approach (The non-
cumul principle) in particular cases concerned with liability for solicitors’ negligence, holding 
that a claim against a solicitor for negligence must be pursued in contract, and not in tort.279    
The case arising in the borderland of tort and contract began with a claim of negligence 
against the person who engaged in a trade or common calling such as the case of a ferryman who 
negligently overloaded his boat and drowned the plaintiff's horse; the case of a surgeon who 
negligently operated on his patient; the case of carpenter who built unskillfully and a barber who 
injured the plaintiff’s face.280  Those foregoing cases were sued in the form of trespass on the 
case that is a kind of tort claims.281  After that the action on the case for negligent conduct was 
expanded to the bailment cases by applying the notion of an assumpsit of the defendant’s 
undertaking to serve the plaintiff.282  The reason why the actions were brought in the form of tort 
was because all proceeding actions was originally in the form of tort actions.283  Later, the action 
of assumsit has separated from the action on the case and has become a contract action.  By 
                                                          
279 Henderson v. Merrett Syndicates Ltd. [1995] 2 AC 145 (HL) 185 (appeal taken from Eng.) 
(this view is stated by Lord Goff in Henderson’s case.). 
280 WILLIAM LLOYD PROSSER, SELECTED TOPICS ON THE LAW OF TORTS: FIVE LECTURES 
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S Hein Reprint ed. 1982). 
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considering the development of both tort and contract cause of actions, there is the view that it is 
still possible to maintain the tort action on the case in any contract situation.284  Ultimately, it 
was clear that the notion of assumsit would lie for any breach of contract.  However, in certain 
situations there might still maintain a remedy in tort action.285  
When Tort and Contract became the separate area, it is necessary for the court to 
determine the limits of the tort action.  In other words, the English court has to determine 
whether there must be an election of the remedy or whether the cause of action pleaded in the 
case at bar was the one in contract or the other in tort.286  So it appeared that at one time the 
actions against the carrier287 and the bailee288 were treated as the pure contract.   
Finally, English courts have recognized the choice of the substantive rights of plaintiff by 
considering the substance of the action pleaded in order to make a classification.289  Interestingly, 
it was said that the U.S. courts have followed the earlier English decisions, but courts also have 
their own confusion.290  The primary and significant question the courts have to find the answer 
                                                          
284 See PROSSER, Id. at 384. 
285 See PROSSER, Id. at 386. 
286 See PROSSER, Id. at 386. 
287 See PROSSER, Id. at 386; see also Boson v. Sandford, 3 Salk. 203, 91 Eng. Rep. 777 (1690); 
Dalston v. Janson, 5 Mod. Rep. 89, 87 Eng. Rep. 538 (1700); Powell v. Layton, 127 Eng. Rep. 
669 (1806). 
288 See PROSSER, Id. at 386; see also Coggs v. Barnard, 1 Comyns 133, 92 Eng. Rep. 999 (1703). 
289 See PROSSER, Id. at 386-87. 
290 See PROSSER, Id. at 387. 
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is that when does the breach of contract also meet the required elements of torts?  There is also 
the view that contract itself is the important factor and source of tort obligation.291  
Considering English decision, there exists an opinion provided that “Wherever there is a 
contract and something to be done in the course of the employment which is the subject of that 
contract, if there is a breach of duty in the course of that employment, the plaintiff may recover 
either in tort or in contract.”292  More importantly, concurrent liability between breach of contract 
and tort was clearly recognized in Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd [1995] 2 AC 145, (HL) 
which will be thoroughly discussed in Chapter five.293  In Henderson, Lord Goff discussed the 
two possible approaches about the effect of the contractual relationship in excluding duty of care 
in tort: the first view that is taken in France is that the contract excludes a remedy in tort: the 
second approach that is taken in Germany is that contractual and tort claims may be concurrent.  
After having analyzed the authorities, Lord Goff accepted the view that the existence of 
contractual contract does not exclude the concurrent duty in tort.  Lord Goff said that:   
“But, for present purposes more important, in the instant case liability can, and in 
my opinion should, be founded squarely on the principle established in Hedley 
Byrne itself, from which it follows that an assumption of responsibility coupled 
with the concomitant reliance may give rise to a tortious duty of care irrespective 
of whether there is a contractual relationship between the parties, and in 
consequence, unless his contract precludes him from doing so, the plaintiff, who 
has available to him concurrent remedies in contract and tort, may choose that 
remedy which appears to him to be the most advantageous.”294  
                                                          
291 See PROSSER, Id. at 400; see also Dean v. Hershowitz, 177 A. 262 (Conn. 1935). 
292 See PROSSER, Id. at 406-07; see also In Brown v. Boorman, 11 Cl. & F. 1, 8 Eng. Rep. 1003, 
1018 (1844). 
293 See BURROWS, supra note 45, at 46. 
294 Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd., [1995] 2 AC 145 (HL) 194 (appeal taken from Eng.). 
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However, the party must keep in mind that he cannot have double recovery by judgment 
satisfied for more than one monetary remedy based on both causes of action.295  It is clear that 
though the court has accepted the principle of concurrence, this does not deny the parties’ 
freedom to include a term in their contract excluding another cause of action provided that such 
term is enforceable under the governing rule.296   
Turning to consider U.S. jurisdiction, there are many cases holding that a carrier is still 
liable in negligence tort as well as in breach of contract for all damages to the passenger and to 
the passenger’s properties.297  In such tortious liability of carrier case, the contract is considered 
only as an incidental.  Similarly, the bailee, innkeeper and physician are also held liable in tort 
for damages arising out of the breach of duty imposed in the parties’ relationship.298  There is the 
view that the U.S. courts tend to be more liberal in imposing the tortious duty to the case of 
misfeasance in breach of contract.299  Until the early 17th century, the assumsit as the primary 
form for contract and Case as a form for tort were overlapped and the action raised by 
contracting parties could be pleaded in Case and vice versa.300 
It is clearly stated once in the decision of Indiana court301 that the duty of care is implied 
from the contractual relationship, and a breach of contractual contract can establish a failure to 
exercise the duty of care that creates tort liability.  When such situation occurs, Indiana court 
                                                          
295 See BURROWS, supra note 45, at 163. 
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297 See PROSSER, supra note 280, at 403. 
298 See PROSSER, Id. at 405-06. 
299 See PROSSER, Id. at 407. 
300 See Speidel, supra note 22, at 164. 
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allowed plaintiff to choose to sue in tort or in contract.  In Flint & Walling Mfg. Co. v. Beckett, 
79 NE. 503, 505 (Ind. 1906), the court referred to Professor Pollock’ s view that in some cases, 
the tortious liability may coexist with a liability for breach of contract arising from the same facts 
towards the same person.  The duty of reasonable care is not released merely because of the fact 
that the parties are under a contract, and may be liable for breach of contract.302  
However, maybe because of the different protected interests and the origin of legal duties 
as well as obligations, there appear the conventional views that the areas of tort and contract are 
entirely distinct and the breach of contract is not in itself a tort.303  However, it is argued that a 
rule of law lies behind both tort and contract so that the fields of contract and tort is 
overlapping.304  Moreover, tort duties can at times be created by contractual promises.305 
 In the twentieth century, courts have expanded the boundaries of tort by imposing the 
doctrine of “bad faith breach” in insurance contracts.306  Until 1984 there are some suggestions 
that the court should extend this cause of action beyond the insurance cases.307  However, most 
jurisdictions refuse to apply tortious liability in usual employment relationship between 
employer and employee where the employee was discharged by the employer under at-will 
                                                          
302 Id. at 505-06. 
303
 See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, supra note 5, at 7. 
304 See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, Id. at 7. 
305 See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, Id. at 7; see also Shadday v. Omni Hotels Management 
Corp., 477 F.3d 511,512 (7th Cir. 2007). 
306 See FARNSWORTH ET AL., supra note 9, at 22. 
307 See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 762. 
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employment.308  In addition, California court finally refused tort remedy for noninsurance 
contract breach in the absence of violation of an independent duty arising from principle of tort 
law.309 
In addition, an economic perspective regarding the imposition of tort damages when the 
party is in the efficient breach is raised in order to criticize the appropriate approach of allowing 
tort claim.   
As to economic perspective, it is argued that even though the imposition of tort damage 
will invade the principle of sufficient breach, the economic analysis still supports imposing tort 
damage in the breach of contract.  It is supposed that tort damage will be an appropriate and 
necessary remedy independent of the remedies presented by contract theory if it is imposed to 
prevents an opportunistic breach of contract.310  California courts allow tort claim by having 
relied on the special relationship between the party as the justifiable rationale.311  However, 
courts did not discuss, in detail, the factors that are necessary to support that a claim of breach of 
the implied covenant should sound in tort.312  Moreover, because there has been the idea that the 
                                                          
308 See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 763; see also Bourgeous v. Horizon Healthcare Corp.,872 P.2d 
852 (N.M. 1994). 
309 See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 763; see also Freeman & Mills, Inc. v. Belcher Oil Co., 900 
P.2d 669 (Cal. 1995). 
310 Barry Perlstein, Crossing the Contract-Tort Boundary: An Economic Argument for the 
Imposition of Extracompensatory Damages for Opportunistic Breach of Contract, 58 BROOK. L. 
REV. 877, 879-80 (1992-1993). 
311 Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654 (1958); Crisci v. Sec. Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 
173 (Cal. 1967); Commercial Cotton Co., Inc. v. United Cal. Bank, 163 Cal. App.3d 511, 516 
(1985); Price v. Wells Fargo Bank, 261 Cal. Rptr. 735, 739 (1989). 
312 Seaman’s Direct Buying Serv., Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 686 P.2d 1158 (Cal. 1984) (later, 
Seaman’s holding of tort recovery for bad faith denial of liability under noninsurance contract 
was overruled by Freeman & Mills, Inc. v. Belcher Oil Co., 900 P.2d 669 (Cal. 1995)).      
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contracting party should not be penalized for the efficient breach,313 it is suggested that the 
nature of the breach should be analyzed and defined to justify tort remedies to prevent the 
deterrence of sufficient breach of contract.314   
In summary, studying through the historical development shows that the plaintiffs have 
originally relied on the form of tort actions in all disputes between the parties.  However, when 
both U.S. and English contract laws have been developed separately from tort law, it is likely 
that the contracting parties’ rights have lied in the law of contract to protect parties’ expectations.  
Nevertheless, until the 20 the century both U.S. courts and courts of England have been 
confronted with the pragmatic problems of concurrent claim between contract and tort. Notably, 
there exists the recognition of concurrent tortious liability, especially tort of negligence, in 
certain situations in many kinds of contracts.  The concurrent tort claim has been recognized for 
many reasons raised by courts but it has been restricted for some reasons as well. Interestingly, it 
is suggested that in recognizing the concurrent tort claim, the court should consider the concept 
of efficient breach that is developed in U.S. contract law.  
IV. CONCURRENT LIABILITY UNDER U.S. LAW 
Negligence cause of action under U.S. law has developed from the action on the Case.315  
Notably, the action on the Case involved the parties whose duties depend upon their relationship 
                                                          
313 See Speidel, supra note 22, at 166. 
314 See Perlstein, supra note 310, at 880. 
315 See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, supra note 5, at 190; see also S.F.C. MILSOM, HISTORICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 399 (2d ed 1981). 
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by contract or status.316  The relationship under the contract may require each party to act in the 
way that can avoid harm to the other party.317  It has been generally acceptable that the tort 
liabilities based on fault of defendant are the general basis of liabilities in all cases, in particular, 
liabilities for other damages other than pure economic loss.318  However, it also has been 
accepted that in general, not doing the required act at all or “nonfeasance” does not create the 
tortious liability.  There is nevertheless the tortious liability for “misfeasance.”  If the defendant 
undertakes to perform his duty and then he does not completely perform his duty, this is the kind 
of “misfeasance” that might be actionable in tort and make the defendant liable for it.319  In 
addition, standard of care owned by each party was implicitly imposed by their relationship.320  
Further, there is also an extension of tort liability for nonfeasance.  Whenever there is the 
contractual relationship between the party giving an affirmative duty to act, it has become 
recognized that there might be tortious liability for nonfeasance.321 
In the cases where courts recognized concurrent tortious liability either by considering 
the nature of claim or by adhering to the form of action, the court will provide the justifiable 
reasons in many respects to support their judgments as we can see in the cases explained in this 
chapter.  
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A. An Elective Right to Concurrent Tortious Liability 
U.S. court clearly recognized the freedom of election between contract claim and tort 
claim in Comunale v. Trader & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654 (1958) by stating that “…it is the 
rule that where a case sounds both in contract and tort the plaintiff will ordinarily have freedom 
of election between an action of tort and one of contract…”322  This can be perceived that the tort 
liability can be raised even though there exists the contractual relationship.  Taking the cases of 
non-compliance with bailment contract as the examples,  where the bailment terms require the 
bailee to return the undamaged goods, courts held that the plaintiff has the choice to sue in either 
breach of contract or in tort negligence.323  This means that the contracting party is not 
compelled to rely only on breach of contract action even though there exist the contractual rights 
and duties between the parties.324  In bailment cases, the tort of conversion or negligence is 
allowed in accordance with the plaintiff’s choice.325  Moreover, it is conceded in one New York 
court that tort liability may arise out of or be coincident with contract under the same set of facts 
and between the same parties.326  However, in some situations the plaintiff may be compelled to 
sue only in contract claim.  These situations could be the cases that plaintiff will seek for the 
recovery of economic loss. 
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B. The Recognition of Concurrent Tortious Liability for Economic Loss 
The economic loss rule is invoked in considering whether the plaintiff can sue in tort 
action claiming for the suffered damages that are not the physical harms to plaintiff or plaintiff’s 
property.  Under economic loss rule, some courts refuse tort claim and insist that plaintiff should 
rely on contract claim where the plaintiff and defendant have contracted with respect to the 
matter claimed.327  This is because courts view that the contracting parties have allocated the 
economic risk by making an agreement.328  If the tort liability for economic risks is allowed, tort 
law will undermine the parties’ contractual allocation of responsibilities for economic loss.329  
When the tort claim is excluded by economic loss rule, the plaintiff has to rely on contractual 
claim even though such claim may be barred by disclaimers, limitation period or damages 
limitations.330  Therefore, when pure economic tort rule is invoked in cases where one party 
claiming that the other negligently perform a contract between them, contract will replace the 
tort duty of reasonable care and plaintiff can only seek for relief in contract action331 except for 
certain circumstances such as in the case of  professional negligence such as a legal malpractice 
claim.332  So in some legal malpractice actions the claims may be brought as a contract claim and 
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a negligence claim and the court may deal with the question as to whether the lawyer violates his 
tortious duty created by the contract.333  In such malpractice claims, the economic loss rule does 
not apply to eliminate negligent liability if the special relationship between the parties is 
proved.334  Notably, in proving the element of legal malpractice action, the plaintiff must prove 
the lawyer’s duty being established and imposed from the client-lawyer relationship between 
them.335  Therefore, in asserting professional negligence, the plaintiff must take the burden of 
pleading and proving all essential elements of claim. 
1. Pleading Both in Contract Claim and Tort Claim in One Suit Is Allowed in 
Professional Negligence 
Taking the decision of Kohn, Savett, Klein & Graf, P.C. v. Cohen, Civil Action No. 89-
2173, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4150 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 10, 1990) as an example, the court recognized 
that the plaintiff in a legal malpractice action has a choice in concurrent claim and stated that in 
Pennsylvania, an action for legal malpractice may be brought in either contract or tort.336  In 
Kohn, the court held that when this malpractice counterclaim is premised upon the plaintiff’s 
negligent conduct of the case, it sounds in tort.  The court also reasoned that although all legal 
representation virtually occurs within the scope of a contract between lawyer and client, this does 
not mean that the contractual limitations period automatically applies.  The court would rather 
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look to the terms of the contract allegedly breached and to the nature of the injury asserted.337  In 
addition, it is noticeable in this case that the court allowed the different counts of counterclaim 
claiming both in contract and tort.  
When plaintiff is allowed to assert both contract claim and tort claim in one suit, the court 
must consider the gravamen of complaint to determine the plaintiff’s right.  In such case, the gist 
of allegations is significantly considered by the court in finding whether the plaintiff’ s legal 
malpractice claim sounds in tort or contract.  In N.Y. Cent. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Edelstein, 637 F. 
App’x 70 (3d Cir. 2016), the court held that appellants’ Second Amended Complaint in legal 
malpractice action sounds in tort and agreed with the District Court that appellants’ tort claim is 
untimely.  The court reasoned that when the court considered the gravamen of appellants’ 
allegations, it appeared that appellants do not identify a specific contractual obligation in any 
provisions that appellees failed to perform or point to an explicit agreement or instruction that 
appellees breached.  The court also concluded that this is a case in which the contract between 
appellants and appellees is best “regarded merely as the vehicle, or mechanism, which 
established the relationship between the parties, during which the tort of negligence was 
committed.”338  By considering the gist of allegations, it is likely that courts allow tort claim in 
addition to contract action. 
2. An Adequacy of Asserting Claims Is Required in Legal Malpractice Action 
 Plaintiff is required to prove both the essential elements of a breach of a professional duty 
and the actual loss arising from a breach. 
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Looking at the requirement of the adequacy of asserting claim in legal malpractice case, 
in Stacey v. City of Hermitage, No. 2:02-cv-1911, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29359 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 
7, 2008), the court ruled about the ways plaintiff states a valid claim for legal malpractice against 
defendants under either contract or tort theory.  The court applied pleading standard set forth in 
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007), for evaluating motions to dismiss 
plaintiff’ complaint that asserted claims of legal malpractice, contract, and conspiracy.  The 
standard is that a complaint may not be dismissed unless it appears beyond doubt that the 
plaintiff cannot prove set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.  This 
means that a complaint must allege enough facts to show that a claim is plausible and not merely 
conceivable.  By applying such standard, the court held that the amended complaint not only 
fails to set forth sufficient facts to establish the elements of a legal malpractice claim but also did 
not state the basic essentials of an enforceable agreement under assumpsit theory such as offer, 
acceptance and consideration.  Such holding of this court emphasized that in asserting cause of 
action in concurrent claim, plaintiff is required to explain enough facts proving that defendant’ 
conducts meet all elements of legal malpractice or breach of contract.  In particular, for asserting 
claim of legal malpractice, one of the essential elements is proof of actual loss rather than a 
breach of a professional duty causing only nominal damages, speculative harm or the threat of 
future harm.  Importantly, a plaintiff must prove “a case within a case” by showing that he had a 
viable claim in an underlying case and that the attorney was negligent in prosecuting that 
action.339 
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3. Concurrent Tort Claim Is Not Excluded under the Independent Duty Doctrine. 
 As being discussed above, the right to pure economic loss is generally allowed in a 
breach of contract claim while such loss is harshly restricted in tort action.  It is noteworthy that 
even if some courts have the same purpose of excluding tort claim because of the economic loss 
rule, courts choose not to refer to such rules by name and decide the case by considering the gist 
of the action340 instead.  This lead to the development of independent duty doctrine in the case 
where the court allowed plaintiff seeking for pure economic loss in tort action rather than action 
in contract.  It may be stated that the exceptions to the economic loss rules are usually provided 
and illustrated, for example, in the case where the defendant is under the duty of tort that is 
independent of the contract and the contract does not reflect an intent to make the contractual 
remedy exclusive.341  
In Eastwood v. Horse Harbor Found., Inc., 170 Wash. 2d 380 (2010), the Supreme Court 
of Washington disagreed with the Court of Appeals’ interpretation and application of the 
economic loss rule in limiting the plaintiff’ right to contractual remedies.  The court argued that 
an injury is recoverable in tort if such injury traces back to the breach of duty that arises 
independently from the contractual terms.  The court described that Washington law342 imposes 
upon every tenant the duty to not cause waste which is a tort duty arising independently out of a 
lease contract.  The duty to not cause waste is considered as independent tort because an early 
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American authority described such duty as an obligation the tenant owes even if the lease 
covenants say nothing about the issue.343  Thus, the court held that the injured lessor can ask for 
damages concurrently under both in tort and breach of contract.  Additionally, in deciding the 
issue of this case, the court opted the term “independent duty doctrine” instead of the term 
“economic loss rule” because the permissible tort remedy depends on the existence of 
independent tort duty344, not on whether the injury can be described as an economic loss.   
Significantly, although the statutory law imposed the tort law duty to not cause waste, 
such duty is usually supplemented by a lease covenant allocating responsibility for repairs 
between the parties.  When the lease provisions are violated by one party and the other party 
suffers from damages, the question usually arises as to whether the economic loss is limited to be 
remediable under the law of contracts or whether it is also the tort of “waste” within the meaning 
of provision of statute.345  Recently, the answer to foregoing question is already provided in the 
decision in Eastwood case that plaintiff can simultaneously commit a breach of lease and a 
breach of a tort duty that arises independently of the lease’s terms.346  
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C. The Recognition of Concurrent Tortious Liability in a Bad Faith Breach of 
Contract 
In U.S. Jurisdiction, courts are attempting to allow tort damages for bad faith breach of 
contract.  This also illustrate one kind of development in a rigid doctrinal division between tort 
and contract.347  The justifiable rationale is that every contract contains an implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing.348  When the contracting party violates the covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing, he can thus be held liable in tort.  This kind of concurrent tort cause of action 
being invoked in Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654 (1958).  In Comunale, the 
court opined that there is an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in every contract 
including policies of insurance that neither party will do anything which will injure the right of 
the other to receive the benefits of the agreement.  The court in Comunale v. Trader & Gen. Ins. 
Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654 (1958) created a bad faith breach of insurance contract to impose a tortious 
liability on insurers who refused to settle the claim asserted by third party.349  The implied 
obligations are imposed based upon the principles of fair dealing which enter into every contract 
even if such duties are not expressly stated in written contract.  The court has also emphasized 
and relied on the test of the existence of the special relationship between insurer and insured 
when the court held that a tort action is available for breach of the covenant in an insurance 
contract.  This special relationship is characterized by the elements of public interest, adhesion, 
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and fiduciary responsibility.350  Accordingly, the court ruled that where a case sounds both in 
contract and tort, the plaintiff will ordinarily have freedom of election between an action of tort 
and one of contract.351  Interestingly, this case also mentioned an exception to the freedom of 
election rule.  The exception to elective right is made in some suits for personal injury caused by 
negligence, where the court considered that the tort character of the action prevails.  However, 
such exception is not applied in this case which related to financial damage.  Notably, the court 
refused applying the doctrine of bad faith breach beyond the insurance contract.352  Nevertheless, 
there are some of the U.S. decisions353 holding that the bad faith withdrawal or termination from 
the pre-contractual phase of negotiations may result in extra-contractual liability based on the 
doctrine of promissory estoppel.354  The court reasoned that the preliminary negotiations 
generate a social relationship that imposes on the parties the duty to act in good faith, which not 
only governs legal relationships already established, but also those derived from a simple social 
contract.  Notably, these cases illustrate that under the doctrine of promissory estoppel, U.S. 
courts also impose the duty of good faith beyond the insurance contract especially in pre-
contractual phase of loan agreement.355 
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D. The Recognition of Concurrent Tortious Liability to a Third-party Beneficiary 
 Some courts permit non-contracting party who suffers from contracting party’s breach of 
contract to bring lawsuit against breaching party claiming in tort.  
 There is another California case that the court allowed the third party as the beneficiary 
of the will to seek for damages in tort by considering the special relationship between the 
attorney and the intended beneficiary.  In, Heyer v. Flaig, 70 Cal. 2d 223 (1969), the court 
concluded that an attorney who negligently fails to fulfill a client’s testamentary directions incurs 
liability in tort for violating a duty of care owed directly to the intended beneficiaries.  The duty 
of care in this case is imposed by considering the contexts of the relationship between the 
attorney and the intended beneficiary.  In this case, the court also referred to the public policy 
that requires the attorney to exercise his duty to not cause harms to persons whose rights and 
interests are certain and foreseeable.  Ultimately, the court concluded that the complaint stated a 
sufficient cause of action in tort under the doctrine of Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583 (1961).  In 
Lucas, the court stated that the harmed party not only could recover as an intended third-party 
beneficiary of the attorney-client agreement providing for legal services but also recover on a 
theory of tort liability for a breach of duty owed directly to him.  The court also cited Biakanja v. 
Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647 (1958) where the defendant argued that the absence of privity deprives a 
plaintiff of a remedy for negligence committed in the performance of a contract.  The court 
rejected the defendant’s contention and then analyzed that the determination whether the 
defendant will be held liable to a third person not in privity is a matter of policy and involves the 
balancing of various factors including356 (1) the extent to which the transaction was intended to 
                                                          
356 Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 650 (1958). 
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affect the plaintiff; (2) the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff; (3) the degree of certainty that 
the plaintiff suffered injury; (4) the closeness of the connection between the defendant’s conduct 
and the injury suffered; (5) the moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct and (6) the 
policy of preventing future harm.  Therefore, the new rule is imposed under California law as to 
the concurrent situation that the doctrine of privity of contract is not required for a third person 
who suffers from damages arising from negligent performance of contractual duty.357   
E. The Recognition of Concurrent Tortious Liability due to the Public Policy 
Concern 
There is the view that tort law has intruded into the contract in order to protect public and 
private interests other than the expectations of the parties.358  Also, courts find nothing 
inconsistent in holding that a certain set of facts give rise to a tort action for one purpose, and to 
an action in contract for another purpose.359  In so doing, the court’ decision is motivated by the 
public policy behind the rule that is in question before the court in finding the borderline between 
contractual claim and tort claim.360 
                                                          
357 United States use of L.A. Testing Lab. v. Rogers & Rogers, 161 F. Supp. 132 (S.D. Cal. 
1958) (holding that by considering policy and all factors in this case, the prime contractor’s 
claim stated against the architect is actionable under the law of California despite its lack of 
privity of contract.). 
358 See Speidel, supra note 22, at 182; see also Palmateer v. Int’l Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 
421 N.E.2d 876, 880 (1981) (holding that employee can alleged the cause of action in tort of 
retaliatory discharge against the employer who terminated at-will employment contract. This is 
because such termination of contract violates public policy favoring investigation and 
prosecution of criminal offenses.). 
359 Peter W. Thornton, The Elastic Concept of Tort and Contract as Applied by the Courts of 
New York, 14 BROOK. L. REV. 196, 197 (1948). 
360 See Thornton, Id. at 213. 
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 Taking New York Courts as the example cases that recognized concurrent liability due to 
the public policy concern, New York court drew the rule regarding the existence of duty of care 
arising out of the subcontract in Lord Elec. Co. v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 226 N.Y. 427 
(1919).  In Lord Elec. Co., the city of New York entered into a contract with plaintiff for surface 
construction work on a bridge.  After that, plaintiff entered into a contract with defendant to 
furnish all labor and materials for the asphalt work.  It appeared that during the progress of the 
work, defendant caused a fire which damaged the bridge structure.  As a result, plaintiff was held 
liable under principal contract.  Consequently, this case is brought by plaintiff.  The ruling of this 
case imposed the duty of care to the party in performing all duties arising from sub-contractor 
contract.  This court reasoned that the plaintiff agreed with the city to take ample precaution to 
protect the entire structure against injury by fire.  And according to the subcontract, the 
defendant was also bound to take ample precautions to protect the entire structure against injury 
by fire caused by it.  The court further reasoned that the plaintiff’s liability under principal 
contract should not be extended to cover the entire work.  Likewise, the defendant’s liability 
should not be limited to its own work when defendant accepted all the conditions of the principal 
contract.  Therefore, it is fair and reasonable to interpret and impose duty of care to the defendant 
under the subcontract.  Considering the rule on concurrent liability, the court held that plaintiff’s 
allegations and proof were sufficiently broad to enable it to establish a cause of action based on 
negligence.  The court indicated that negligence, considered merely as a tort, is a wrong 
independent of contract, but negligence may also be a breach of contract if the contract itself 
calls for care.  From the decision in Lord Elec. Co., it is the rule that the plaintiff is allowed to 
concurrently assert the cause of action of negligence when the contract itself calls for care.  In 
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particular, the court required a fair and reasonable construction of contract between the party in 
imposing the duty of care on the defendant. 
Moreover, other decisions also demonstrate that where the facts in any action appear that 
the elements of both tort and breach of contract are presented, New York courts may provide the 
different answers for the questions whether the action is viewed as in tort or in contract.  The 
following situations illustrate that apart from providing the plaintiff’s elective right between 
action in contract and tort,361 New York courts also determined the essential nature of the action 
and held that action sounds in tort rather than in contract, for the purpose of solving the issue 
before the court.362   
In terms of statute of limitations issue, it is necessary to determine the fundamental nature 
of the action in order to consider whether it is barred or not.  Some cases were held that the tort 
statute of limitations applied because the courts felt that the gravamen of the claim caused by 
negligence even though the form of the action was the contract.  In Webber v. Herkimer & M. S. 
R. Co., 109 N.Y. 311 (1888), Court of Appeals of New York held that the carrier is liable to the 
plaintiff in damages if plaintiff as the passenger suffered from personal injury without his fault.  
The court reasoned that common carriers of passengers are not insurers of personal safety so 
when there exists an injury, happening to the person of a passenger, the carriers are only liable 
for negligence in failing to use due care, diligence or skill in and about their undertaking.  
However, the action is statutory barred because plaintiff did not submit the claim within the 
                                                          
361 Busch v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 187 N.Y. 388, 80 N.E. 197 (1907). 
362 Loehr v. E. Side Omnibus Corp., 18 N.Y.S.2d 529 (App. Div. 1940). 
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limitation of three years.  Significantly, in deciding cases under the statute of limitations, courts 
found cause of action in tort regardless of the plaintiff’s form of the action.363  
In Loehr v. E. Side Omnibus Corp., 18 N.Y.S.2d 529 (App. Div. 1940), the question as to 
whether a cause of action is barred by the three-year Statute of Limitations is raised.  The Court 
of New York adopted the rule laid down in Webber case.  The court still held that the cause of 
action sounds as tort rather than contract even though the facts is apparent that plaintiff’s 
allegation clearly indicated the violation of the term of the contract.   
It seems that, for the purpose of statute of limitations issue, courts indicate that 
negligence conduct gives rise to a tort action despite the fact that the duty was established by 
contract.364  Stated another way, if the gravamen of case is found in tort, the plaintiff cannot 
circumvent the statute of limitations by asserting in contract action.  It is also recognized that, if 
the gravamen sounds in tort, it is justified in asserting tort action which is more favorable for 
plaintiff.365    
F. Summary 
U.S. law has recognized the elective right of concurrent tort claim, in particular, in cases 
where the plaintiff brings the suits for the recovery of physical harms to a person or property.  
However, U.S. law restricts the tort claim in cases where plaintiff is seeking for pure economic 
loss not resulting from physical harm or physical contact to a person or property.  Concurrent tort 
claim for the recovery of economic loss is permitted only in certain circumstances such as in the 
                                                          
363 Hermes v. Westchester Racing Ass’n, 210 N.Y.S. 114 (App. Div. 1925). 
364 See Thornton, supra note 359, at 201. 
365 Hutchinson v. Smith, 417 So. 2d 926 (Miss. 1982). 
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case of professional negligence, claim for bad faith breach of insurance contract.  Significantly, 
U.S. courts are attempting to develop and apply the independent duty doctrine rather than 
economic loss rule to allow more tort of negligence claims for economic loss.  Importantly, in all 
concurrent cases, the underlying rationales being raised by courts to support concurrent tort 
claim mostly relate to either the public policy concerns such as solving the issue of limitation 
period, establishing fairness and reasonableness between the parties or a gap-filling mechanism 
in contract law such as fulfilling the gap of an absence of privity.      
V. CONCURRENT LIABILITY UNDER ENGLISH LAW 
Under English law, the concurrent liability between contract and tort is mainly raised and 
criticized in claims of negligence.  The court will be in the dilemma situation to consider whether 
the tortious duty of care should be imposed on the defendant who is voluntarily bound by the 
contractual duty.  The number of the situations creating an overlap between breach of contract 
and negligence tort has been risen over the period of time.366  In particular, the question as to 
whether the contracting party can sue in tort arises when the tort negligence has been expanded 
and allowed the plaintiff to recover pure economic loss in some situations.367  Under English 
law, it seems unacceptable for imposing the duty of care which is inconsistent with what the 
parties have agreed especially when the duty of standard of care is more burdensome than the 
express or implied contractual duty.368  Therefore, it is likely to be the principle rule that so long 
                                                          
366 See BURROWS, supra note 151, at 5. 
367 See BURROWS, Id. at 5; see also Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd. v. Heller & Partners Ltd. [1964] AC 
465 (HL) (appeal taken from Eng.); Midland Bank Trust Co. Ltd. v. Hett, Stubbs and Kemp 
[1979] Ch 384; White v. Jones [1995] 2 AC 207 (HL) (appeal taken from Eng.); Merrett v. Babb 
[2001] QB 1174 (CA) (appeal taken from Eng.). 
368 See BURROWS, supra note 151, at 6. 
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as the tort negligence is consistent with the terms of contract, there is no objection to the plaintiff 
choosing to sue either for breach of contract or for the tort of negligence if one of them is 
considered to be more favorable to the plaintiff.369  It has appeared that the plaintiff’s right to 
choose to rely on tort of negligence is traditionally accepted in the case where the defendant 
exercises his duty in the course of the ordinary occupations such as carriers, innkeeper or 
bailee.370  Specifically in medical treatment case, the answer to the question arising as to whether 
there is the concurrent liability in tort is always in the affirmative.371  Recently, it is apparent that 
a solicitor who performs his duty for the reward owes the duty both in contract and tort.372 
There are the controversial views as to the bailment contract such as hire of goods. When 
the bailee misuse or damages the goods, Winfield viewed that the bailee is not in tort but is liable 
in breach of contract because the bailee’s duty arises from the relationship the parties have 
agreed.373   However, this view is argued that the bailor should have the right to claim ether 
breach of specific provision in contract or breach of the bailee’s common law duty that amounts 
to tortious liability.374  This is because there are tortious duties that can only exist when there has 
been the prior contract between the parties.  
                                                          
369 See BURROWS, Id. at 6. 
370 See BURROWS, Id. at 6. 
371 See CLERK & DUGDALE, supra note 61, ¶ 10-07; see also Edwards v. Mallan [1908] 1 KB 
1002 (CA) (appeal taken from Eng.). 
372 See CLERK & DUGDALE, Id. ¶ 10-101. 
373 See WINFIELD, supra note 62, at 10. 
374 See WINFIELD, Id. at 10. 
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A. An Elective Right to Concurrent Tortious Liability 
It is possible that both contractual liability and tortious liability co-exist on the same set 
of facts and the alternative claim for damages is available.375  In such situation the court allows 
the tort claim provided that concurrent claim is not expressly or implicitly exclude by contract.376  
In the case where the plaintiff is the contracting party, it is acceptable that where there is the 
contractual relationship between the parties and the defendant is in breach of contract, the 
plaintiff may choose to sue in tort instead in order to circumvent the limitations in contract law 
or to be able to make a claim going beyond what was agreed in the contract.377  In another 
situation where the plaintiff is not the party to the contract but the plaintiff suffers from damages 
because of defendant’s breach of contract, the court allows the action in tort because the doctrine 
of privity precludes a contractual claim.  Although most cases have accepted the concurrent tort 
claim when the issue is raised, it is still controversy in specific situations. And this may be the 
case of claiming for economic loss in tort action.378  
B. The Recognition of Concurrent Tortious Liability for Economic Loss under the 
Assumption of Responsibility Doctrine 
 As being stated in chapter two, if plaintiff suffers only economic loss arising from 
defendant’s negligent conduct, generally, he will not be allowed to recover such damages under 
tort claim.  However, since there is the decision of Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd. v. Heller & Partners 
Ltd. [1964] AC 465 (HL), lawyers and other professionals could be held in being liable for 
                                                          
375 See WINFIELD, Id. at 11. 
376 See CLERK & DUGDALE, supra note 61, ¶ 1-05. 
377 See CLERK & DUGDALE, Id. ¶ 1-05. 
378 See CLERK & DUGDALE, Id. ¶ 1-05. 
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negligence independently of contract.  It can be said that the duty of care will arise if the 
professions undertake any task to provide service for the other that relies on the profession’s 
competence and skill.  Under the concept of assumption of responsibility, it also appeared in the 
case of medical service that the medical practitioner who either provides the treatment 
gratuitously or performs for the reward is liable for negligent treatment of the patient.379  English 
law also implicitly imposed duty of care that is bound by the supplies.  Under the Supply of 
Goods and Services Act 1982 Section 13, there exists the implied duty of the suppliers who 
perform their task in the course of a business that the suppliers will carry out the service with 
reasonable care and skill.  Hence, when the suppliers negligently breach of duty of reasonable 
care, this will establish a breach of contract380 and negligence tort as well.  
It is recognized that the assumption of responsibility doctrine plays an essential role in 
liability for pure economic loss.381  To illustrate the recognition of concurrent tort liability under 
the Assumption of Responsibility Doctrine, the following cases will be considered. 
To begin with, In Hedley Byrne, it appeared that the bankers negligently provided the 
recipient (a firm of advertising agents) favorable reference for one of their customers.  Moreover, 
when giving the reference in relation to the credit-worthiness of their customers, bankers knew 
or ought to have known that the plaintiffs would rely on their special skill and judgment in 
furnishing the reference.  And the plaintiffs in fact relied upon the reference provided and then 
placed the advertising order on behalf of the company (the bank’s customer) that later turned out 
                                                          
379 See CLERK & DUGDALE, Id. ¶ 10-05. 
380 See CLERK & DUGDALE, Id. ¶ 10-06. 
381 Andrew Robertson & Julia Wang, The Assumption of Responsibility, in THE LAW OF 
MISSTATEMENTS: 50 YEARS ON FROM HEDLEY BYRNE V HELLER 49, 49 (Kit Barker & Ross 
Grantham & Warren Swain eds. Hart Publishing, 2015). 
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not being respectably constituted company and being into liquidation.  As a consequence, the 
plaintiffs suffered financial loss.  Accordingly, the question arose whether bankers could be held 
liable in tort in respect of the gratuitous provision.  In Hedley Byrne, the facts appeared that the 
relationship between two parties is not contractual because it is gratuitous (no consideration).  
But, in principle, the court permitted liability in the absence of consideration by standing in the 
way of an appropriate allocation of risk on the merits and regarding the consideration as a 
technicality.382  The reasons why the House of Lords allowed the liability in the absence of 
consideration is expressed in two factors.  First, courts have often expressed ambiguous, even 
critical, sentiments about consideration as a requirement for contractual validity.383  The court 
gave the reason that without consideration the promise is unenforceable as a contract but if it 
appears that the service is in fact performed negligently, the tort action should be actionable for 
recovery damages.384  Second, courts focused on the economic reality of the relevant relationship 
and explained that by giving the reference for the customer, the bank received the benefit in 
some respects as to its business.385   
Indeed, we can find that English court began with providing the plaintiffs right to tort 
claim because the contract is unenforceable because of the absence of consideration.  Stated 
simply, in Hedley Byrne, plaintiffs could ask the courts to recognize negligence action for 
recovery of financial loss regardless of persistence of consideration when the court found that 
                                                          
382 Janet O’Sullivan, Suing in Tort Where No Contractual Claim Will Lie – A Bird’s Eye View, 
23 PROF. NEGL. 165, 169 (2007). 
383 See O’Sullivan, Id. at 169. 
384 Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd. v. Heller & Partners Ltd. [1964] AC 465 (HL) 525-26 (appeal taken 
from Eng.). 
385 See O’Sullivan, supra note 382, at 170. 
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defendants assumed the responsibility towards the plaintiffs in such circumstances.  In other 
words, the duty of care towards the recipients of information was owned by the bankers.  To 
provide the principle in this case more precisely, we should consider Lord Morris of Borth-y-
Gest’s opinion which stated that: 
“My Lords, I consider that it follows and that it should now be regarded as settled 
that if someone possessed of a special skill undertakes, quite irrespective of 
contract, to apply that skill for the assistance of another person who relies upon 
such skill, a duty of care will arise.  The fact that the service is to be given by 
means of or by the instrumentality of words can make no difference.  Furthermore, 
if in a sphere in which a person is so placed that others could reasonably rely upon 
his judgment or his skill or upon his ability to make careful inquiry, a person takes 
it upon himself to give information or advice to, or allows his information or 
advice to be passed on to, another person who, as he knows or should know, will 
place reliance upon it, then a duty of care will arise.”386 
 
However, in this case a duty of care was finally negated since there was an express 
disclaimer of responsibility. 
More particularly, the tort liability is clearly allowed in the case of Solicitor’s liability.  In 
Midland Bank Trust Co. Ltd. v. Hett, Stubbs and Kemp [1979] Ch 384, the court allows the 
plaintiff to sue in tort for negligently omitting to register the option as an estate contracts by 
reason of the existence of the relationship between solicitor and client that is the relation of a 
client consulting a solicitor for advice. 387  This kind of relation in Midland Bank Trust Co. Ltd. 
gave rise to a duty of care under the Hedley Byrne principle.  
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Furthermore, in Midland Bank Trust Co. Ltd.,  Lord Oliver J. gave his opinion that by 
looking at the speech of Lord Devlin in the Hedley Byrne, he believed that Lord Devlin treats the 
existence of a contractual relationship as very good evidence of the general tortious duty.388  
Therefore, he gave reasons and held that the relationship of solicitor and client gave rise to a duty 
in the solicitors under the general law to exercise their duty of care and skill upon which they 
must have known well that their client relied.389  After that, the decision in Midland Bank Trust 
Co. Ltd. was admitted by the House of Lords in Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd 1995 2 AC 
145 (HL) holding that defendants owed the duty of care to plaintiffs so that plaintiffs could seek 
for pure financial loss in tort action even though limitation period in contract claim was barred 
but it was not in tort claim.  
In Henderson, the consistent concurrent liability for breach of contract and negligence 
tort is fully accepted in another type of professional relationship.  That is the relationship 
between Lloyd’s Names and their underwriting agents who carry out their underwriting functions 
towards the Names for whom they acted under the underwriting agency agreement.  In 
Henderson, even though there is the contractual relationship between the plaintiffs (Lloyd’s 
Names) and defendants (Managing Agents), plaintiffs (both direct Names and indirect Names) 
chose to allege a concurrent duty of care in tort.  This is because plaintiff wish to be able to get 
the benefit of the longer limitation period in this case where the date for the accrual of the cause 
of action in tort occurred later than that in contract.  In this case, with respect to the liability of 
managing agents to Names (both direct and indirect Names) in tort, the court held that plaintiffs 
could sue in tort to recover damages for pure economic losses.  The court further explain that the 
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existence of contractual relationship is not the objection.390  Moreover, Lord Goff’s opinion 
indicated that the parties can expressly agree to restrict or exclude the tortious liability, provided 
that such agreement is subject to the ordinary principle of validity.391 
Looking at the opinion in Henderson’s case in detail, we can see that the tortious duty of 
care is imposed under the concept of assumption of responsibility and tort liability is allowed for 
the reason of preferable limitation period.  Lord Goff reasoned that in the cases of claim against 
the professional parties such as solicitors or architects, it is possible that the contractual claim is 
barred by limitation period at the time of breach when the plaintiff is unaware of the existence of 
breach.  So the concurrent liability in tort is necessary to protect the plaintiff when the 
consequences of party’s negligent breach may occur after the lapse of limitation period for 
contract claim.392  Lord Goff also referred to the statements and the application of the assumption 
of responsibility principle that was stated by Lords in Hedley Byrne.  For instance, Lord Devlin 
in Hedley Byrne opined about the doctrine of assumption of responsibility by saying that:  
“categories of special relationships which may give rise to a duty to take care in 
word as well as in deed are not limited to contractual relationships or to 
relationships of fiduciary duty, but also include relationships which…are 
‘equivalent to contract’ that is, where there is an assumption of responsibility in 
circumstances in which, but for the absence of consideration, there would be a 
contract.”393  
After considering the statements of doctrine, Lord Goff stated that:   
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“we can derive some understanding of the breadth of the principle underlying the 
case.  We can see that it rests upon a relationship between the parties, which may 
be general or special to the particular transaction, and which may or may not be 
contractual in nature.  All of their Lordships spoke in terms of one party having 
assumed or undertaken a responsibility towards the other. On this point, Lord 
Devlin spoke in particularly clear terms… Further, Lord Morris spoke of that 
party being possessed of a special skill which he undertakes to apply for the 
assistance of another who relies upon such skill.”394 
Furthermore, Lord Goff suggested that “…once the case is identified as falling within the 
Hedley Byrne principle, there should be no need to embark upon any further enquiry whether it 
is ‘fair, just and reasonable’ to impose liability for economic loss…”395  
 Finally, Lord Goff concluded that the principle of assumption of responsibility has been 
expressly applied to a number of different categories of person who perform services of a 
professional or quasi-professional nature, such as bankers, solicitors, surveyors, valuers, 
accountants and insurance brokers.396  If the plaintiff relies on the advice or the statement 
provided by the defendant who has the special skill, the defendant owns the duty of care to the 
other party and may be held to take responsibility for his negligent conduct.  It does not matter 
whether the defendant carries on the business of giving the kind of advice that is sough or not.397 
Apart from the reasons provided in such three cases mentioned above, it is further explained that 
                                                          
394 Henderson v. Merrett Syndicates Ltd. [1995] 2 AC 145 (HL) 180 (appeal taken from Eng.). 
395 Henderson v. Merrett Syndicates Ltd. [1995] 2 AC 145 (HL) 181 (appeal taken from Eng.). 
396 Henderson v. Merrett Syndicates Ltd. [1995] 2 AC 145 (HL) 181-82 (appeal taken from 
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the special relationship is established when the defendant assume responsibility to perform the 
task rather than the assumption of legal liability to the plaintiff for its careful performance.398   
1. The Tortious Duty of Care Is Denied by the Effect of Exculpatory Provision. 
Even if there is the acceptance of the concurrent liability, the parties are free to include a 
term in their contract excluding another cause of action.399  Especially, although there is the 
special relationship between the parties in the case of undertaking the task of providing a 
statement or services, the duty of care imposed on the ground of assumption of responsibility is 
denied where it appears that the defendant disclaims his liability in respect of a statement or 
services.400  The disclaimer may be treated as the relevant fact to consider whether the 
assumption of responsibility should be invoked.401  Therefore, it is undisputable rule that in 
principle concurrent tortious liability is recognized.  However, it is unacceptable to allow the 
plaintiff suing in tort when the contract action is not available because of the existence of an 
express disclaimer by the defendant or the exculpatory terms that are inconsistent with tortious 
duty of care.402  Keeping in mind that, both a disclaimer and exculpatory terms are governed by 
the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, the issues of statutory validity and interpretation of 
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(appeal taken from Eng.). 
399 See BURROWS, supra note 45, at 46. 
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& Partners Ltd. [1964] AC 465 (HL) (appeal taken from Eng.); see also Robertson & Wang, 
supra note 381, at 62. 
401 See CLERK & DUGDALE, Id. ¶ 8-108; see also McCullagh v. Lane Fox & Partners Ltd. [1996] 
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contractual terms or those of disclaimers may thus arise in concurrent action.  Accordingly, only 
enforceable disclaimer can have an effect on the exclusion of duty of care.403   
Taking Robinson v. PE Jones (Contractors) Ltd., [2011] EWCA Civ 9; [2012] QB 44 
(CA) as an example, in this case the plaintiff who purchased a house, which was under 
construction, from the defendant who was the builder, sued for damages for the expenses in 
rebuilding as the pure economic loss.  The facts appeared that the contract incorporated the 
National House-Building Council’s (NHBC) standard form of agreement which limited the 
builder’s liability for defects to the first two years.  The plaintiff also brought the claim against 
the defendant in tort of negligence to get the advantage of limitation period.  The preliminary 
issue was whether the defendant owed the plaintiff a concurrent duty of care in tort in respect of 
pure economic loss.  Finally, the plaintiff’s right to recover pure economic loss was refused by 
the reason that the duty of care in tort was inconsistence with the contractual term stating that 
“the defendant’s liability to the plaintiff would be limited to that set out in the NHBC agreement 
and had thereby expressly agreed to exclude any liability which might otherwise arise…”404  And 
the court held that such terms were reasonable under the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977.  The 
reason is stated in Lord Jackson LJ’s opinion that “It is not possible for the plaintiff to invoke the 
law of tort in order to impose liabilities upon the defendant which are inconsistent with the 
contract.”405  
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We can see that English law permits parties to the contract to include the exculpatory 
clause in order to exclude or restrict tortious liability for financial loss as long as such clause is 
reasonable under the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977.  This indicates that the parties’ right to 
allocation of risk under contract is still recognized and protected by the court.  
2. The Tortious Duty of Care Is Denied in Relation to Defective Things Giving Rise 
to Pure Economic Loss 
Meaningfully, in Robinson v. PE Jones (Contractors) Ltd., we can see that the court also 
considered the characteristic of relationship between the parties which is normally considered as 
the key factor in giving the answer to the question as to whether one party assumes the 
responsibility that gives rise to the tortious duty of care regarding the economic loss.  In giving 
the answer to this question, in Robinson v. PE Jones (Contractors) Ltd., Lord Jackson LJ 
reasoned that the parties had not been in a professional relationship whereby the plaintiff paid the 
defendant for advice, reports or plans on which he would rely, but they had entered into a normal 
contract for the purpose of completing the construction of a house and buying it.406  Therefore, 
although there is no limitation of liability clause incorporated in contract, the defendant as the 
builder did not owed the tortious duty of care in relation to any defect in the building giving rise 
to pure economic loss.  It was further explained that tort law limited more duty of care upon the 
manufacturer or builder than that on the other professionals.  Clearly stated, the manufacturer or 
builder owes the duty to take reasonable care to protect only suffering personal injury or damage 
                                                          
406 Robinson v. PE Jones (Contractors) Ltd., [2011] EWCA Civ 9; [2012] QB 44 (CA) 62 
(appeal taken from Eng.). 
91 
 
to other property.407  In Robinson v. PE Jones (Contractors) Ltd., Lord Jackson LJ considered 
Lord Goff’s opinion in Henderson’s case and concluded that the essential points of Henderson’s 
case are: 
“(i) When A assumes responsibility to B in the Hedley Byrne sense, A comes 
under a tortious duty to B, which may extend to protecting B against economic 
loss. (ii) The existence of a contract between A and B does not prevent such a 
duty from arising. (iii) In contracts of professional retainer, there is commonly an 
assumption of responsibility which generates a duty of care to protect the client 
against economic loss.”408 
 
However, the opinion in Robinson v. PE Jones (Contractors) Ltd. has been criticized that 
it is difficult to explain precisely what it is about giving professional advice or reports that 
justifies Lord Jackson LJ’s opinion.409  
Interestingly, apart from Lord Jackson LJ’s opinion, Lord Stanley Burnton LJ provided 
another strong opinion that:  
“it must now be regarded as settled law that the builder/vendor of a building does 
not by reason of his contract to construct or to complete the building assume any 
liability in the tort of negligence in relation to defects in the building giving rise to 
purely economic loss.” 410  
Lord Stanley Burnton LJ further explained that the distinction between the case where the 
party owes the tortious duty of care and case where the party does not, is the difference of two 
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parties between a party who supplies defective things which causes damage to person or other 
properties and a person who supplies defective or valueless things themselves.411  Taking an 
architect for example, the architect will owe a duty of care in relation to the building that is 
defective when being constructed with architect’s drawing of specification supplied by him.  But 
the other party cannot sue an architect in tort of negligence action simply because his plans are 
worthless.  From this view, we can see another indication as to the existence of concurrent 
tortious duty particularly in building contract.  That is, to consider whether something that is 
supplied by one party causes the injury to person or other things.  If the answer is in the 
affirmative, the party who supplies the thing under contract also owes the duty in tort to the other 
party. 
3. The Tortious Duty of Care Is Denied by the Effect of Scope of Duties Imposed by 
the Contract. 
There is another interesting decision that restrict the imposition of tortious duty of care on 
the contracting party.  From this viewpoint, the duty of care in tort can concurrently arise 
between the parties to the contract if such duty will not be more extensive than the duties 
imposed by the contract.412 Put this in another way, the duty in tort will not extend further than 
the contractual duty to the client.413   
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In Tai Hing Cotton Mill Ltd. v. Liu Chong Hing Bank Ltd. [1986] AC 80 (PC), the issue 
is whether the company as the bank’s customer owed the duty of care in tort to his bank to 
examine his bank statements so as to be able to detect forgeries.  Lord Scarman delivered the 
judgment of their Lordship of the judicial Committee of the Privy Council in relation to the 
nature and extent of the duty of care owed by a customer to his bank in the operation of a current 
account.  Considering Lord Scarman’s statement thoroughly, he raised the question that 
“Whether English law recognizes today any duty of care owed by the customer to his bank in the 
operation of a current account…414  As to the question stated by Lord Scarman, their Lordships 
of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council answered the question that the customer’s duty in 
English law in relation to forged checks is limited in twofold: first, a duty to refrain from 
drawing a check in the manner that may facilitate fraud or forgery, and second, a duty to inform 
the bank of any forgery of a check purportedly drawn on the account as soon as he becomes 
aware of it.415  From their Lordships’ view, it is stated that if the bank wants to put a wider duty 
of care to the customer to take the reasonable care in operating a current account, the bank and 
his customer can agree a clear contractual terms binding obligation upon the customer to query 
his bank statement.416  Their lordships further stated that it cannot believe that there is anything 
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to be beneficial for imposing a liability in tort where the parties are in a contractual relationship 
in particular to a commercial relationship.417   
It is well to keep in mind that although there was the opinion of Tai Hing Cotton Mill 
Ltd., as discussed before, there was also the appearance of some cases418 that clearly recognized 
the concurrent tortious duty of care by adopting the Hedley Byrne doctrine of assumption of 
responsibility.  In addition, there is the view that support the application of the assumption of 
responsibility doctrine as a mechanism in fulfilling the gap in contract law such as the restriction 
of the concept of consideration and privity of contract under English contract law.419   
C. The Recognition of Concurrent Tortious Liability to a Third-party Beneficiary 
Concurrent tortious liability is also applied as the gap-filling mechanism when the court 
confronted with the problem under the principle of privity of contract.  In White v Jones 1995 2 
AC 207 (HL), the tort claim was available where the plaintiff was not the party who has entered 
into the contract with the defendant.  In this case, the court held that the duty of care was owed 
by the solicitor to the plaintiffs who will be the intended beneficiaries under particular will.  
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Also, the concept of the assumption of responsibility is invoked in White’s case in order 
to fill the gap whereby the third person who suffered the loss cannot sue in contract because of 
the doctrine of privity.420  To fill the gap of contract law in White’s case, Lord Goff stated that  
“… the nature of the transaction was such that, if the solicitors were negligent and 
their negligence did not come to light until after the death of the testator, there 
would be no remedy for the ensuing loss unless the intended beneficiary could 
claim. In my opinion, therefore, your Lordships’ House should in cases such as 
these extend to the intended beneficiary a remedy under the Hedley Byrne 
principle by holding that the assumption of responsibility by the solicitor towards 
his client should be held in law to extend to the intended beneficiary who (as the 
solicitor can reasonably foresee) may, as a result of the solicitor’s negligence, be 
deprived of his intended legacy in circumstances in which neither the testator nor 
his estate will have a remedy against the solicitor.”421   
The important reason provided by Lord Goff that should be emphasized is that for the 
reason of privity problem, a tortious duty of care will be recognized only in limited circumstance 
where the court found that plaintiff could not have the opportunity to protect his economic well-
being by using contractual mechanism.  We can observe that when the plaintiff is not in a 
position to protect himself upon contractual claim, courts are willing to solve privity problem by 
recognizing a duty of care in tort between defendant and non-contracting party provided that the 
contract is intended to benefit non-contracting party.422   
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D. The Scope of Recoverable Damages in Concurrent Tortious Liability May Be 
Limited to the Rule of Contract. 
It appeared that there exist the cases where the court recognized the existence of the 
concurrent liability in both contract and tort but the court limited the plaintiff’s right to take 
advantage of the more generous rules for remoteness of damage available in tort. 
In Banque Bruxelles Lambert SA v. Eagle Star Insurance Co. Ltd. [1997] AC 191 (HL) 
that comprised of three cases, defendants as valuers, were required by the plaintiffs to value 
properties on the security of which they were considering advancing money on mortgage.  Later, 
it appeared that defendants considerably overvalued the property causing the loss to the plaintiffs 
who made the loans.  And, in each case, the plaintiffs brought actions against the defendants 
claiming that defendants were in negligence and breach of contract.  The court held that the 
cause of action meets the requirement both in contract and tort.  As it is stated in Lord 
Hoffmann’s opinion that: 
 “Because the valuer will appreciate that his valuation, though not the only 
consideration which would influence the lender, is likely to be a very important 
one, the law implies into the contract a term that the valuer will exercise 
reasonable care and skill. The relationship between the parties also gives rise to a 
concurrent duty in tort: see Henderson v. Merrett Syndicates Ltd. [1995] 2 A.C.  
145. But the scope of the duty in tort is the same as in contract. 
     “A duty of care such as the valuer owes does not however exist in the abstract. 
A plaintiff who sues for breach of a duty imposed by the law (whether in contract 
or tort or under statute) must do more than prove that the defendant has failed to 
comply. He must show that the duty was owed to him and that it was a duty in 
respect of the kind of loss which he has suffered.”423   
 
“…the scope of the duty, in the sense of the consequences for which the valuer is 
responsible, is that which the law regards as best giving effect to the express 
obligations assumed by the valuer: neither cutting them down so that the lender 
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obtains less than he was reasonably entitled to expect, nor extending them so as to 
impose on the valuer a liability greater than he could reasonably have thought he 
was undertaking.”424  
 
It is noticeable that this concurrent case begins to apply the same limitation of the scope 
of duty in respect of the kind of loss suffered in tort as that applied in contract.   
Taking Wellesley Partners LLP v. Withers LLP [2015] EWCA Civ 1146; [2016] Ch 529 
(CA) as another example, the court held that the defendant firm of solicitors had been 
professionally negligent for misdrafting a limited liability partnership agreement and the court, 
however, applied the contractual test for recoverability of damage for economic loss.  The court 
further explained and concluded in Lord Floyd LJ’s opinion that:  
“contractual and tortious duties to take care in carrying out instructions exist side 
by side, the test for recoverability of damage for economic loss should be the 
same, and should be the contractual one. The basis for the formulation of the 
remoteness test adopted in contract is that the parties have the opportunity to draw 
special circumstances to each other’s attention at the time of formation of the 
contract. Whether or not one calls it an implied term of the contract, there exists 
the opportunity for consensus between the parties, as to the type of damage (both 
in terms of its likelihood and type) for which it will be able to hold the other 
responsible.  The parties are assumed to be contracting on the basis that liability 
will be confined to damage of the kind which is in their reasonable contemplation. 
It makes no sense at all for the existence of the concurrent duty in tort to upset 
this consensus, particularly given that the tortious duty arises out of the same 
assumption of responsibility as exists under the contract.”425  
 
The argument for the application of the remoteness test and for the court’s conclusion is 
supported by the scholar’s view in his footnote 57 of McGregor on Damages.426  It is submitted 
that the victim of the case of concurrent professional negligence should not be allowed to rely on 
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the wider tortious test of reasonable foreseeability and ignore the stricter contractual test of 
contemplation of the parties, in particular, when the pure economic loss is allowed in tort of 
negligence427  This is because the victim is the party to the contract, not a stranger and the parties 
should be bound by the risk they have allocated under their contractual relationship. 
It is worth noticing that this case raised the significant viewpoint as to the difference in 
the tests for remoteness of damage between the two causes of action.  Obviously, it has long 
been conceded that according to Lord Goff’s statement in Henderson’s case, one of the practical 
issues or problems of concurrent liability is the difference in the tests for remoteness of damage 
between contract action and tort cause of action.  Nevertheless, the test for remoteness of damage 
in cases of concurrent liability was not an issue before their Lordships in Henderson, but the 
issue was whether there was in fact a concurrent cause of action in tort at all.  In Wellesley’s 
case, the concurrent tort cause of action remains actionable but the scope of damages is limited.  
So it is likely that after Wellesley’s case, the court might equate the scope of revocability of 
pecuniary loss in tort and in contract by applying the contractual test of remoteness to concurrent 
tort claim.  More interestingly, it is suggested by one scholar that tortious liability and 
contractual liability are parallel and essentially subject to the rules of their respective liability 
regimes.428  It is also true even in this Wellesley’s decision.  However, the reasonably foreseeable 
losses of the tort are limited by the reasonably foreseeable losses under the contract regime in the 
case where the tortious duty derived from the contractual duty.429  This application of remoteness 
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rule does not mean that tort regime is trumped by contract regime.430  It is thus submitted that the 
consequence of the application of two independent set of remoteness rule depends on the precise 
fact situation in which concurrent liability in tort and contract has arisen.431   
E. Summary 
Similar to U.S. law, English law recognized the freedom of election between an action of 
tort and one of contract particularly an action for the recovery of physical harms to a person or 
property.  However, English law strictly imposes the tortious duty of care where the plaintiff 
askes for pure economic loss arising from the negligent acts or omissions of contracting party.  
Consequently, English courts invoked the principle of assumption of responsibility to allow the 
plaintiffs to be entitled to pursue concurrent tort claim for the recovery of pure economic loss.  
The assumption of responsibility doctrine required proof of special or professional relationship 
between the parties whereby one party paid the other party for advice, reports or plans on which 
he would rely.  Accordingly, courts strictly put the duty to the builders or manufacturers to take 
the reasonable care in providing the defective things to the other party.  In addition, the tortious 
duty of care may be denied by the effect of the specific duty imposed by the contract.   More 
importantly, although there exists the professional relationship between the party, English courts 
have the tendency to deny tortious duty if it is considered to be inconsistent with the contractual 
terms especially any forms of enforceable exculpatory provisions.  And it appears that English 
courts are likely to protect the parties’ expectations by applying the more rigorous test of 
remoteness of contract law to grant the recoverable damages in concurrent tort claim.  All in all, 
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in any cases of concurrent claims, we may conclude that English court considered issue of 
limitation period, consideration and privity of contract as merely the technical aspects of contract 
law preventing plaintiffs from suing for breach of contract.  In considering such issues, it appears 
to be that courts are willing to allow plaintiffs to sue in tort instead as long as the tort liability is 
not excluded by the others relevant rules and principles. 
VI. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF CONCURRENT LIABILITY 
In both U.S. and English laws, it is no doubt that where one contracting party’s conduct 
causes harms to the other party, non-breaching party can rely on contact action in most cases.  
Conversely, it has long been controversial regarding the right to elect to sue in tort instead of 
asserting contract claim when there exists the contractual relationship between the parties.  By 
considering the differences between contractual and tortious liability in chapter two, we can see 
some aspects of contract law that are more advantageous than those of tort law. Therefore, in 
such situations the plaintiff definitely prefer action in contract to tort.  And of course, there are 
many justifications for suing in contract so long as such contract terms are enforceable.  
However, there may be the gaps under contract law such as the absence of privity that bring 
about the need to rely on tort law instead.  In addition, the tort action may provide more 
advantages in terms of the recovery of greater damages or of other technical issues such as the 
issue of limitation period.  One may think that for the sake of certainty and consistency it is more 
plausible to allow the plaintiff to rely on just only contract claim in all situations.  But we cannot 
deny that in some situations, the contracting party also deserves to be protected under tort law at 
the same time.  Moreover, it appears that the parallel tort liability in contract is recognized in 
both U.S. law and English law.  The juridical decisions and academic views in both legal 
systems also have the important influence on the recognition of concurrent liability between 
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contract and tort.  However, all views are based on the rules of contract and tort law in their legal 
systems which are different in some respects.  The development of contract law either in the 
form of common law or statutory law has played the crucial role in developing concurrent tort 
claim in both systems as well.  As can be seen, the contracting party is certainly entitled to assert 
tort claim as the elective right in both U.S. and English jurisdictions.       
In U.S. jurisdiction, even though concurrent liability is recognized, it is obvious that the 
breach of contract cannot also be a tort in every case.  There are the restrictions especially in 
cases where the plaintiff asks for the recovery of his economic loss.  This is because U.S. 
contract law has long been governed by the economic loss rule.  In the cases where the 
concurrent tort of negligence is brought for recover economic loss, U.S. law requires the 
existence of special relationship between the parties to allow such claim.  In other words, in the 
case of professional negligence, U.S. court has permitted tort action for pure economic loss.  For 
such exception, the clear criteria for determine whether the defendant is one of the professionals 
are required.  In addition, it is generally excepted that attorney or counsel against whom the legal 
malpractice claim is brought can be seen as the professional.  Nevertheless, the plaintiff in legal 
malpractice claim must plead his claim and prove the elements of legal malpractice action with 
caution to make his claim meet all essential elements of professional negligence action.  As such, 
to consider the issue of concurrent tort claim for economic loss raised by the party in other kinds 
of relationship, we may consider and apply the criteria discussed in some lawsuits claimed by 
clients against attorneys.  This is because legal malpractice claim can be seen as the common 
example in some respects in relation to the concurrent tortious action for economic loss. 
Additionally, U.S. courts develop the rule of independent duty and choose to apply such 
rule rather than make a reference to pure economic loss rule.  As a result, the concurrent tort 
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claim for economic loss is actionable when the court believes that the gravamen of the complaint 
gives rise to the duty of care which is independent of the contract.  We can observe that by 
adopting the independent duty doctrine, the court may extend the application of such rule to 
impose concurrent tortious duty to the parties of the contract beyond the professional 
relationship.  This approach tends to be less strictly in recognizing the concurrent claim in U.S. 
law. 
Apart from the independent duty doctrine and the existence of special relationship in 
professional malpractice claim, U.S. court establishes the concept of bad faith breach of contract 
that amounts to tort liability especially insurer’s tortious liability in insurance contract.  Yet, the 
court has emphasized and relied on the test of the existence of the special relationship between 
insurer and insured to hold that a tort action is available for breach of the covenant in an 
insurance contract.  So this kind of special relationship that is characterized by the elements of 
public interest, adhesion, and fiduciary responsibility remains restrictive for the recognition of 
this kind of tort liability in other relationships so long as other relationships have similar 
characteristics with the insurance contract. 
 In effect, there is an attempt to restate the certain rules with regard to tort liability for 
economic loss arising from contract (Economic Loss Rule) by the American Law Institute.  The 
main principles have been restated in the tentative drafts No. 1 (§§ 1-6)432 and tentative drafts 
No. 2 (§§ 6-8).433  This work is aimed at looking on torts that involve economic loss, or 
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pecuniary harm not resulting from physical harm or physical contact to a person or property.  
Sections 1 through 5 of Chapter 1 of the tentative drafts No. 1 were approved by the membership 
at the 2012 Annual Meeting of the Members of the American Law Institute.  
In brief, according to this Restatement, Economic Loss is defined to cover the pecuniary 
damage not arising from injury to the plaintiff’s person or from physical harm to the plaintiff’s 
property.434 It is provided in Section 3 that: 
“Except as provided elsewhere in this Restatement, there is no liability in tort for 
economic loss caused by negligence in the performance or negotiation of a contract between the 
parties.”435  This rule clearly states that when a party is negligent in performing a contract causes 
economic loss to the counterparty, the injured party’s remedies are determined by other law: 
principally the law of contract that has the specific purpose of allocating economic losses that 
result from the performance of contracts.  
This Restatement still recognizes the well-established exceptions to the economic loss 
rule in the case of professional negligence.  Such exception is addressed in § 4 of this 
Restatement.  That is the tort liability of professionals to their clients alongside the contract 
between them.  It is stated in § 4 that “A professional is subject to liability in tort for economic 
loss caused by the negligent performance of an undertaking to serve a client.”436 
So according to the Restatement, the action to recover for professional negligence or 
malpractice action is still a prominent exception to the economic loss rule.  It is reasoned that 
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firstly, it is not always true in the relationship between a client and a professional that they 
negotiated on equal footing to allocate their risks and secondly, the promises of professionals 
tend to be limited to careful efforts rather than results.  
Importantly, these Restatement rules will reduce the confusion that can result when a 
party brings concurrent suit on the same facts under contract and tort theories asking for 
economic loss that are largely redundant in practical effect.  However, adopting these rules may 
bring back the traditional approach that adheres to the strict economic loss rule.  As a 
consequence, the independent duty doctrine may be ignored and ultimately abandoned. 
U.S. law also recognized the third party’s right to bring concurrent tort claim against the 
contracting party who is in breach of contract in the absence of privity of contract.  However, the 
third party’s right to tort liability in concurrent case is granted only in limited circumstances.  
The court has to balance all relevant factors to show both the relationship between the defendant 
and a third-party beneficiary and the public policy concerns such as those of all stated in Heyer v. 
Flaig case. 
In tort of negligence case, it is inclined that the public policy concerns play important role 
in imposition of tortious duty of care together with the contractual obligation.  The court tends to 
interpret the contract in the way that create fairness and reasonableness between the parties.  We 
can imply that without the requirement of fairness or reasonableness, the court may limit the duty 
owned by party only to the contract regime unless there exist the certain circumstances falling in 
the scope of other rules and doctrine that are stated above.   
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Remarkably, when courts confronted with the issue of limitation period in concurrent 
claim, for the policy of the statute of limitations,437 courts tend to consider the gravamen of 
allegations rather than the form of action chosen by the plaintiff to determine whether the action 
sounds in contract or in tort.  Moreover, U.S. court applied the statute limitations of tort liability 
when the court found that the action sounds in tort even though the plaintiff voluntarily elect the 
form of contact claim.  From my viewpoint, though U.S. law allows the plaintiff to plead the 
facts on any cause of action which would fit them in the concurrent situation, U.S. courts have a 
tendency to hold that the plaintiff's claim sounds in contract or in tort by considering the “gist” or 
the “gravamen” of the action particularly when the court determines the issue of substantive law.  
This situation could be the cases that the court confronts with either the question of the statute of 
limitations or the issue of an appropriate measure of damages to be applied in granting the relief. 
In comparison to English law, there has no apparent rules as to the restriction on 
concurrent tortious liability in cases where the imposition of tortious duty will be inconsistent 
with the terms of contract.438  However, U.S. court may rely on the freedom of contract doctrine 
to enforce the terms of contract that reflect the parties’ intent to exclude their liability either 
contractual liability or concurrent liability in tort provided that the contractual terms do not 
violate any other laws or unconscionability doctrine.  It is likely that the U.S. courts do not treat 
the terms of the contract which limit the amount of damages or the requirement of notice of a 
claim within a time limit as the one being inconsistent with tort.  But it would be reasonable and 
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fair if courts have allowed tort action and have held to apply such terms to tort action as well.439  
This is because it reflects the parties’ intent to be bound by contract and protects the bargain the 
parties have made.  Contrary to English law, it does not clearly appear that the court limits scope 
of remedies in tort by using the same test for recoverability of damage in contract claim.   
After considering the rules of concurrent claim in U.S. jurisdiction, we can see that the 
more the nature and limitations of the tort action arising out of a breach of contract are clearly 
defined and illustrated, the more efficiently the plaintiff can deal with his complaint in order to 
sustain his preferable cause of action.  
Turning to English jurisdiction, English law gives elective right to the plaintiff in 
asserting either contract action or tort claim.  Similarly, plaintiff’s right to economic loss in tort 
claim is highly criticized and recognized only in certain circumstances.  English law allows 
concurrent tort claim under the doctrine of assumptions of responsibility.  Similar to U.S. law, 
under the principle of assumption of responsibility, English court mainly focuses on the special 
relationship between the parties in order to hold that the defendant is liable for economic loss in 
concurrent claim of negligence. 
Remarkably, even if the assumption of responsibility is established in Hedley Byrne’s 
case where the plaintiff and the defendant are in the relationship that is equivalent to contract.  It 
appears that such doctrine is applied as a fortiori in order to support the duty of care in tort in the 
case where there is the contractual relationship between the parties.  So in order to bring suit in 
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tort against the counterparty, plaintiff has to show enough facts in proving the existence of the 
assumption of responsibility between them.  And we can see that Henderson’s case is taken as 
the leading authority on concurrent liability in professional negligence.  Later, the doctrine of 
assumption of responsibility is regarded as the conceptual basis for the recognition of all 
professional persons’ concurrent tortious liability for economic loss to their clients such as 
engineer’s duty440 and the medical practitioner.  Notably, although the English courts did not 
clearly refer to public policy concerns to allow the concurrent liability in tort, as can be seen in 
some cases the court invoked the concept of assumption of responsibility for the purpose of the 
limitation period issue at bar.   
However, there exists the scepticism about the assumption of responsibility doctrine.  It is 
submitted by Lord Jackson LJ that the law on concurrent liability should be redefine.  Lord 
Jackson suggests that contracts should not generate duties of care in tort that is identical to the 
contractual obligations.441  In effect, there exist the restrictions on the recognition of concurrent 
tortious liability for economic loss under the assumption of responsibility doctrine in respect of 
different underlying rationales that are described in chapter five.  
Similar to U.S. law, English law also recognized concurrent tortious liability because of 
the effect of the privity of contract doctrine.  English jurisdiction now has its own legislative 
contract law to protect rights of third party.  The limited exceptions to the privity doctrine are 
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addressed in the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999.  Under this act, a third party may 
enforce a contractual term, only if (a) the term expressly so provides or (b) the term purports to 
confer a benefit on him.  When the rights of third party are clearly recognized in this act, this 
may lead to the tendency for the court to strictly impose the tortious duty of care on the 
contracting party to the third party.  At least, the rights of third party in tort claim may be limited 
only to the same conditions imposed in the act.  Additionally, it is submitted that tort law should 
not step in and should not impose duty on contracting parties to third person if the parties to the 
contract do not confer rights on third parties, by using the mechanism of the Contracts (Rights of 
Third Parties) Act 1999442 
Looking, particularly, at the issue of exculpatory clauses, English court is likely to deny 
tortious duty if the duty of care in tort is inconsistent with the terms of contract.  As we have 
perceived that in general, the freedom of contract doctrine allows the parties to freely agree to 
exclude or limit liability for their breach of contract provided that such provisions do not violate 
any statutory restrictions, such as the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 and the Consumer Rights 
Act 2015.  English courts have decided that it would be unreasonable if contracting parties are 
permitted to evade the effect of exclusion or limitation clauses by suing in tort rather than in 
contract.  And whenever the court encounters the issue of validity of exculpatory terms, the court 
can rely on applicable rules of either the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 or the Consumer 
Rights Act 2015 that have the specific purpose to deal with the unfair contract term between the 
parties as the case may be.  So we can observe that when contract terms are enforceable under 
this act, it would bring about a fair and reasonable legal effects to the parties if the court decide 
to adhere to the agreement between them to protect their bargain of interest.  This is the reason 
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why English law does not impose concurrent tortious duty when duty in tort would be 
inconsistent with such contractual provisions.      
In addition, it is noteworthy that the liquidated damages are available only for breach of 
contract.  If the court allows the plaintiff to recover more quantum of damages in tort, plaintiff’s 
right to recoverable damage in tort will be inconsistent with the principle of contract law and 
contrast with the parties’ express intention.  Therefore, the court may analogously treat the 
enforceable term of liquidated damages as one of the restriction on the plaintiff’s right to rely on 
tort claim as well. 
Form my viewpoint, English courts have allowed the concurrent tort claim with caution.  
Moreover, the judgments permitting concurrent liability have been considered as pragmatic 
consideration.  As we can see in chapter five, English courts are inclined to limit the concurrent 
tort claim in some respects.  First, English court denied concurrent tortious duty of care in 
building contract in relation to defective things giving rise to pure economic loss.  The court 
gave the reasons by distinguishing the builder and manufacturer from the professional 
relationship whereby one party paid the other party for advice, reports or plans on which he 
would rely and establishing an indication to consider whether something that is supplied by one 
party causes the injury to person or other things or not.  Second, there is the decision that the 
court attempted to strictly interpret the contractual duty and limited duty of care not to be more 
extensive than the duties imposed by the contract.443  Third, the court recognized the existence of 
the concurrent tortious liability on the condition that the plaintiff’s rights to the scope of damages 
                                                          




in tort claim will be governed by the same contract rule of remoteness in the situation where 
tortious duty derives from contractual relationship.444 
In conclusion, it is apparent that law of contract and tort law under either U.S. law or 
English law are not entirely separate but are linked in respect of the concurrent situation.  We can 
notice that the tort liability particularly tort of negligence under both U.S. law and English law is 
not so extensive even if the concurrency is permitted.  As we can see, even though each legal 
system generally recognizes the concurrent tort claim particularly claim of negligence for 
personal injury, this does not mean that the contracting party is entitled to rely on tort claim in all 
situations.  This is because there are also the restrictions upon the imposition of concurrent tort 
liability especially in the cases where plaintiff brings lawsuit to recover pure economic loss.  In 
addition, it is likely that imposition of the concurrent tortious duty is more rigorously restricted 
under English law than U.S. law in some respects.  
VII. CONCLUSION 
Most of the concurrent situations occur in the cases where 1) the plaintiff asks for the 
recovery in tort claim despite the existence of contractual relationship or 2) the plaintiff asserts 
contract claim but the defendant contends that the issue at bar especially the issue of limitation 
period should be governed by tort law rather than contract law.  In such situations, the court will 
encounter the question as to whether the plaintiff’s allegation sounds in tort rather than in 
contract or vice versa.  By considering the differences between the contract law and tort law on 
the right to remedies, it appears that neither action is exclusively more advantageous than the 
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[2016] Ch 529 (CA) 553-54 (appeal taken from Eng.).  
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other.  Therefore, the more valuable consequences of such rules have the influence on plaintiff’s 
election of his claim when the concurrent situation occurs.  Moreover, it was found that the 
preferable type of damages recoverable (e.g., damages for emotional distress, punitive damages), 
the more advantageous statute of limitation in tort law, the strict application of privity of contract 
doctrine, and the restriction on exclusion of tort liability have influenced on the election of tort 
claim.  
Under common law system, it is the entirely the court’s discretion to recognize the 
concurrent tort liability unless there is the explicit prohibition by the legislature.  Both U.S. and 
English generally recognize concurrent tort claim as an elective right.  However, courts must 
have the justified rationales either to allow the plaintiff’s tort claim or to apply tort rules 
according to the defendant’s defense in order to protect parties’ expectation, create justice and 
reinforce public policy. 
Most of the cases in U.S. and English jurisdictions, courts held that the plaintiff’s 
allegation sounds in tort rather than in contract by considering the “gist” or the “gravamen” of 
allegations notwithstanding plaintiff’s choice of action.  In particular, where the plaintiff asserts 
the claim to recover physical injuries to person or to property in negligence cases, courts are very 
likely to permit tort claim and apply tort rules to the issues disputed rather than contract rules.  
Furthermore, the issue of limitation period and the privity doctrine are considered as merely the 
technical aspects in the concurrent situation.  U.S. and English courts is thus inclined to allow 
plaintiff to rely on tort law if such rules of contract law preventing plaintiffs from suing for 
breach of contract.   
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There are also the restrictions on the permissive rule of concurrent claim particularly in 
the cases where the plaintiff brings lawsuit claiming for the pure economic loss.  After exploring 
both relevant U.S. and English cases as well as academic writing, there appear the critical 
limitations on the rights to tort claim as follows:  
Firstly, it is generally accepted by both U.S. and English courts that the recovery for 
economic loss is limited only in contract claim.  However, U.S. law established the exceptions to 
the economic loss rule in the cases of professional negligence and of bad faith breach of contract.  
Nevertheless, the latter one is mainly limited only in the relationship in insurance contract.  
Additionally, some courts are attempting to develop and apply the independent duty doctrine to 
permit more tort claims of negligence especially for economic loss.  Similarly, English law 
invokes the principle of assumption of responsibility to impose tortious duty of care owed by the 
defendant to the plaintiff.  Under the assumption of responsibility, the special relationship 
between the parties is mainly required in order to grant the award to the plaintiff who assert 
concurrent claim of negligence for economic loss. 
Secondly, it is clear that under English law, the tortious duty of care can be excluded or 
limited by the exculpatory clause or contractual term of liquidated damages.  There exists the 
refusal of imposing the duty of care which is inconsistent with what the parties have agreed in 
their contract.  As to this kind of limitation, it is not apparent that U.S. courts entirely refuse to 
impose tortious duty of care which is inconsistent with what the parties have agreed in their 
contract.  However, it is submitted that courts will not let the plaintiffs suing in tort to get around 
the exculpatory clause that they voluntarily agree to allocate their risks in particular to the risk 
arising from their negligent conduct.  As for this reason, I would also propose that it would be 
fair, just and reasonable if U.S. courts apparently adopt and apply this kind of limitation to 
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restrict concurrent tort claim in U.S. jurisdictions.  This is because U.S. law clearly recognizes 
freedom of contract doctrine.  To sustain such doctrine, the court should not give the plaintiff 
rights under tort law that leads to the severe violation of the fundamental rule of contract which 
has the dominant aim to protect the contracting parties’ bargain of interest in allocation of their 
particular risk in the particular way so far as their interest is not outweighed by the mandatory 
law or public policy.       
Thirdly, it is also suggested by scholars’ views that the doctrine of efficient breach 
recognized in U.S. contract law should be taken into account in limiting the imposition of tort 
liability on the breaching party particularly in commercial transaction bound by the persons who 
are in the crucial role on the development of economic.  As to economic perspective, if breaching 
party can prove that nonperformance is economically efficient, it is socially acceptable.  
Therefore, the party in efficient breach of contract should not be punished by his breach.  
Recognizing tort claim that puts more burdensome on the breaching party in the case where 
efficient breach occurs would lead to the destruction of well-established concept of efficient 
breach and also bring about the unreasonable consequences.  Therefore, I would suggest that 
U.S. courts should take such economic perspective as a factor being considered in permitting 
concurrent tort claim in order to protect public economic interest in general.  However, there is 
also the view that tort liability may be imposed to prevent an opportunistic breach of contract.  
One evidence of this view is the recognition of bad faith breach of insurance contract cases.  
Therefore, I would suggest that the concept of bad faith breach should not be limited only in an 
insurance contract.  This is because U.S. law essentially recognizes that every contract contains 
an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  If the parties to the other kinds of contracts 
can prove that there exists special relationship between them, tortious liability should be allowed 
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when it appears that one party do something which injures the right of the other in order to 
receive the benefits of the agreement.  As the U.S. courts have already provided that special 
relationship in bad faith breach of contract case is characterized by the elements of public 
interest, adhesion, and fiduciary responsibility, courts could consider such factors to find the 
similar characteristic of relationship in other contracts as well.  
Lastly, in English jurisdiction, although courts generally allow the plaintiff to rely on tort 
claim, some courts have a tendency to limit the scope of recoverable damages in concurrent tort 
claim by applying the similar test of remoteness of the breach of contract claim to the tort claim.  
If this approach is prevalent in the most of concurrent cases, the difference in the remoteness test 
of damage between contract action and tort action will no longer affects the plaintiff’s choice of 
claim.  I think this restrictive approach aims at the protection of the parties’ expectation interest 
rather than deterrence the wrongful conduct.  As for such reason, I would suggest that the 
limitation on the scope of recoverable damages is justifiable only in the case where the tortious 
duty exists by virtue of a contract.  This means that in the case where the duty mainly exists by 
the virtue of provision under a statute or the case where the duty exists independently of 
contractual terms, the court should apply the independent set of remoteness rule of tort 
irrespective of the consequence of the application of remoteness rule of contract.  This is because 
in such cases tortious duty is imposed by law itself and also arises independently from the 
contractual duty.  Allowing the plaintiff to take advantage of the more generous rules for 
remoteness of damage available in tort does not create an unreasonable or undue intrusion of 
contracting parties’ expectation interest.  Therefore, for the sake of certainty and consistency, 
English courts should distinguish the precise fact situations in which concurrent tortious liability 
has arisen and apply an appropriate remoteness rules to that particular factual situation.  
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In conclusion, the plaintiff’s right to remedies in tort claim is generally recognized in 
U.S. and English systems.  The existence of contractual relationship cannot entirely preclude the 
plaintiff from the protection under tort law.  However, some limitations on concurrent tort claim 
are also necessary not only to sustain the fundamental and crucial rule of contract but also to 
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